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"The heart of the Communications Act is its clear emphasis on the public interest. Whatever the temptations to abandon this notion - and they are many the stakes are too high. Without commitment to the
public interest, all government action vis--vis communications would be without meaning."I

designed to open all telecommunications markets
to competition by removing legal and regulatory
entry barriers.2 The 1996 Act added new Section
271 to the Communications Act specifically allowing the Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs")
to participate in activities from which they previously were precluded by the Modification of Final
Judgment ("MFJ").3 Pursuant to the new Section
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Act of 1996 was
See S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Conference Report] (The Act provides "for a pro-competitive,
de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all
Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition . . . ."). See also Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272, First Report and
Order and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 696 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards Order] ("The fundamental objective of the 1996 Act is to bring
to consumers of telecommunications services in all markets
the full benefits of vigorous competition.").
3 In re Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 96-308, CC Docket 96-149 paras. 1, 5 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards Notice]. Judge Harold Greene,
2
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I NEWTON MINOW, Commemorative Message, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934, at xv
(Max D. Paglin ed. 1989).
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271 (d) of the Communications Act, a BOC may
apply to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") for permission to
provide long-distance service originating in any of
the BOC's in-region States. 4 In order for the
Commission to grant such a BOC application, the
Commission must find, among other things, (1)
that the BOC has satisfied the terms of the "competitive checklist"5 and (2) that, pursuant to Section 271(d) (3) (C), granting of the BOC application would be "consistent with the public interest,
convenience, and necessity."6 Section 271 (d) (4),
however, provides that the FCC shall not "by rule
or otherwise" limit or extend the terms of the
competitive checklist.7
This article explores the potential tension between Congress' mandate that the Commission
grant only those applications consistent with the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity," and
it is common that the commission not limit or extend the competitive checklist. Construed
broadly, the Commission could use its grant of
public interest authority to require that all BOCs

perform certain actions, in addition to those required by the checklist, in order to receive Section 271 approval from the Commission. Imposition of such extra requirements upon all BOCs
seeking Section 271 authority would constitute an
alteration of the checklist in contravention of Section 271 (d) (4). On the other hand, BOCs have
argued for a much broader reading of Section
271(d) (4)'s prohibition against altering the
checklist." The BOCs' reading essentially would
preclude the Commission from utilizing its public
interest authority to require the BOCs to do anything more than meet the checklist and other express requirements of Section 271 (d) (3). Such a
miserly reading of the public interest would frustrate the FCC's ability to undertake any meaningful public interest review. 9
As explained below, the possible tension between Section 271's public interest and no-alteration provisions is eliminated if the two provisions
are construed such that for any Section 271 application, the Commission may impose conditions or
require actions in addition to those in the check-

who administered the MFJ, which superseded the BOC's
from AT&T since its inception, has observed that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 asks the Commission to "perform a role akin to that which the Court and the [Department ofJustice] had previously performed under the [AT&T
consent] decree." See United States v. Western Elect. Co., 2
Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1388 (1996).
4 Such applications must be filed on a state-by-state basis.
See Procedures For Bell Operating Company Applications
Under New Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public
Notice (Dec. 6, 1996). Thus, for example, Bell Atlantic would
have to file a separate application to provide in-region longdistance services in each of the states it serves. See 47
U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (1) (West Supp. 1996).
5 Section 271(d) (3) (A) of the United States Code requires that BOCs satisfy the fourteen point "competitive
checklist" contained in Section 271(c) (2) (B). The checklist
delineates the minimum requirements that BOCs must offer
other telecommunications carriers pursuant to Section 271.
See Conference Report, supra note 2, at 144-45. One of the major requirements is that BOCs offer interconnection in accordance with Sections 251(c) (2) and 252(d) (1). As such,
the Eighth Circuit has stayed the Commission's order implementing interconnection requirements insofar as it pertains
to pricing and certain other elements. See Iowa Util. Bd. v.
FCC, 4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1360-61 (1996) [hereinafter Eighth
Circuit Stay Order], motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 429
(1996).
6 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (3) (C) (West Supp. 1996).
7 See comment 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (4) (West Supp.
1996).
8 Ameritech has filed pleadings before the Illinois Commerce Commission asserting that the FCC may not add requirements for the approval of a Section 271 application
other than those expressly stated in the 1996 Act. See Amer-

itech Illinois' Legal Memorandum In Response to Order Initiating Investigation, Dkt. 96-0404, at 28-30 (Sept. 27, 1996)
[hereinafter Ameritech Illinois Memorandum] (stating in part
that the FCC may not use Section 271 (d) (4) to "impose conditions on entry that effectively supplement the 'competitive
checklist' under the guise of declaring such conditions necessary to support a 'public interest' finding.") Id. at 30. Bell
Atlantic and Pacific Telesis have made similar comments. See
Videotape: Office of the General Counsel/Common Carrier
Bureau Open Forum re: Section 271 (Federal Communications Commission July 9, 1996) (on file with the FCC) [hereinafter FCC Videotape]; see also Telecom Industry Shows Disagreement on RHC Entry Into Long-distance, COMM. DAILY, July 10,
1996, at 2.
9 Ameritech has asserted that Section 271(d) (4) forbids
the FCC from using its "public interest" authority to impose
conditions on BOC entry that "supplement" the checklist,
such as concluding that BOCs must: (1) enter into more
than one interconnection agreement; (2) lose a certain
amount of market share; (3) face competition throughout
the state; (4) compete with carriers which provide local exchange service over their own facilities-based network; (5) interconnect with a large competitor such as MCI or AT&T; or
(6) comply with stricter separation requirements or nondiscrimination safeguards than those set forth in Section 272.
See Ameritech Illinois Memorandum, supra note 8, at 30. Bell Atlantic has likewise argued that the FCC may not use the public interest to require additional unbundling requirements or
to create new requirements such as mandating that the BOC
face competition over a defined geographic scope. See FCC
Videotape, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Kellogg for Bell
Atlantic). Pacific Telesis has also contended that "once the
checklist is met, the degree and effectiveness of local competition is not a factor." See FCC Videotape, supra note 8 (statement of Richard E. Wiley for Pacific Telesis).
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list, provided that the conditions are warranted by
the public interest, convenience and necessity.
The imposition of new conditions or requirements on a case-by-case basis does not constitute
the kind of unlawful alteration of the checklist
contemplated by Section 271(d) (4).1o Instead,
the ban on altering the checklist is construed
most properly as precluding the Commission
from imposing new conditions or requirements
upon all BOC Section 271 applications.
Part II of this article traces the evolution of the
public interest standard and, in particular, its development along separate lines with respect to
communications common carrier and radio regulation. Part III demonstrates that the public interest has typically been interpreted by the courts as
conferring generous powers upon regulatory
agencies charged with its administration, including the Commission.
Part III begins with an analysis of Section 271's
BOC entry provisions. The section then looks at
the statute's plain language and uses various canons of statutory construction in order to determine the relationship between the Commission's
authority to review applications for their consistency with the public interest and the agency's
statutory inability to alter the competitive checklist.
Part IV concludes that there is no tension between the two provisions, and that Section
271 (d) (3) (C) gives the Commission both the authority and the responsibility to examine all BOC
Section 271 applications to ensure that grant of
such applications is consistent with the public interest.
Part V examines the legislative history to Section 271 and similarly concludes that Congress intended for the Commission to use the public interest to look beyond a BOC's compliance with
the competitive checklist and other express provisions of Section 271.
Lastly, Part VI explains that the Commission's
10 The imposition of public interest requirements on a
case-by-case basis does not run afoul of the well-established
rule that agency adjudications must be applied consistently.
The public interest will vary with the facts of each BOC application. The Commission must simply ensure that analogous
facts should lead to analogous outcomes.
11 For a more in-depth discussion of Lord Hale's treatise,
see Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services, FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84
FCC.2d 445, 523-24 (1981) (quoting De Portibus Maris, HARGROVE LAw TRACTS (1787)); see also GLEN O. ROBINSON, The
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public interest analysis, both legally and practically, must encompass a review of competition
levels in the local exchange market. The section
then suggests various factors that the Commission
should examine under its public interest powers
and discusses how such factors should be weighed
by the agency. Part VI also details the propriety
of, and legal authority, for the Commission to impose metric requirements (i.e., that a BOC face
competition in a certain percentage of the state,
that competitors are able to reach a certain percentage of the BOC's customers, etc.) upon individual Section 271 applications should such requirements be warranted by the public interest
and necessary to the Commission's execution of
its duties.
II.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD CONCERNING
COMMUNICATIONS

The "public interest" was first referenced by
Lord Hale in his late 1600s treatise on seaports in
which he observed that when private property,
such as a wharf or loading dock, is affected with a
public interest, it ceases to be subject only to private control." In 1877, the Supreme Court made
the "public interest" part of American jurisprudence in Munn v. Illinois,12 through its following
Lord Hale's teaching, and by upholding a state
law setting maximum rates for grain elevators. In
so doing, the Court recognized that Lord Hale's
views have been accepted without objection as an
essential element in the law of private property.
A.

Origin of "Public Interest" in Common
Carrier Regulation

Former FCC Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson
has observed that the phrase, "public interest,
convenience and necessity" first appeared13 in
federal legislation in the Transportation Act of
Federal CommunicationsAct: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory
Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
Acr oF 1934, at 3, 15 n.54 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
12 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
1s
The "public interest, convenience, and necessity" or its
companion phrase "common interest" were originally used as
the test for determining whether public funds could be spent
on certain projects, such as highway construction. See City of
Hartford v. Day, 64 Conn. 250, 254-55 (1894); see also Robinson, supra note 11, at 15 n.54. The two phrases were also
used in early state statutes requiring franchises for the con-
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1920 which extended federal oversight of railroads to include a requirement of government approval for the construction and operation of any
railroad.1 4 The public interest language subsequently was incorporated into Sections 1(18)
through (24) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Those sections, however, involved only transportation;1 5 thus, at that time, the authority to regulate
in the "public interest" was denied to the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") with respect
to its supervision over telephone companies and
other communications common carriers.' 6 The
ICC, however, paid scant attention to that deficiency because its supervision of railroads rendered its telephony activities at best laissez-faire. 17

In fact, the "public interest" was not made a
part of federal oversight of communications common carriers until the passage of the 1934 Communications Act which consolidated authority
over radio and telecommunications common carriers in one entity, the newly-created Federal
Communications Commission.' 8 In so doing,
Congress specifically modeled the Commission's
common carriage responsibilities on those borne
by the ICC in relation to transportation:
In this bill many provisions are copied verbatim from
the Interstate Commerce Act because they apply directly to communications companies doing a common
struction of railroads. See In re Application of Shelton St. Ry.,
69 Conn. 626, 38 Ad. 362 (1897). See also supra note 12.
14 See Robinson, supra note 11, at 15 n.54. The Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91 § 402 , 41 Stat. at 476-78 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1994)), "requir [ed] a certificate of public interest, convenience and necessity as a condition of constructing, acquiring, or abandoning any line of railroad." Id.
15 See Cox and Byrnes, The Federal Communications Act: An
Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONs AcT OF 1934, at 25, 40 (Max
D. Paglin ed., 1989).
16 The ICC had been vested with power over telephones
by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910. See Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309
§ 7, 36 Stat. 544-45 (adding telephony oversight to ICC).
Although the Postmaster General took over operations of the
telephone and telegraph companies as a wartime measure
from August 1918 through July 1919, oversight was thereafter
returned to the ICC. See LEON KNAUER, TELECOMMUNICATIONs Acr HANDBOOK, 13, 41 (1996); Cox and Byrnes, supra

note 15, at 25, 29.
17
See 78 CONG. REc. S. 4139 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1934)
(statement of Sen. Dill) (The ICC has "not had time to give
real consideration" to telephony regulation.). See also Robinson, supra note 11, at 4 n.7. ("Virtually all observers thought

that telephone .

.

. services had been ignored" by the ICC.);

Cox and Byrnes, supra note 15, at 25. (noting that ICC conducted only a small number of telecommunications proceedings).
18
The FCC was created in order to strengthen federal
oversight over telephony and to increase the efficacy of gov-
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carrier business, but in some paragraphs the language
is simplified and clarified. These variances or departures from the text of the Interstate Commerce Act are
made for the purpose of clarification in their application to communications, rather than as a manifestation
of congressional intent to attain a different objective.' 9

Thus, for example, Section 214 of the Communications Act, specifically requires, like its predecessor Section 1(18) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, that carriers seeking to construct, acquire,
operate or transfer any line must obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
FCC. 20
B.

Origin of "Public Interest" with Respect to
Radio Regulation

Radio regulation was originally entrusted to the
Secretary of Commerce by the Radio Act of
1912.21 However, in 1923, the Act of 1912 was interpreted to grant the Secretary of Commerce
only ministerial powers concerning licensing,
such that the Secretary could not deny a license
on public interest grounds or on any other basis,
for example, to protect other licensees against interference.22 That same year, then-Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover suggested that radio
be considered a public utility and regulated as
ernment communications regulation overall. See Robinson,
supra note 11 at 3, 4.
'9
See S. REP. No. 73-781, at 2 (1934). The House Report
similarly stated that Communications Act was designed to
"preserve the value of court and commission interpretation
of [the Interstate Commerce Act], but at the same time modifying the provisions so as to provide adequately for the regulation of communications common carriers." See H. R. REP.
No. 37-1850, at 4 (1934). See also Ivy Broad. Co. v. AT&T, 391
F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1968) (cases decided prior to 1934
under the Interstate Commerce Act "retain their importance
for purposes of determining the scope of the Communications Act of 1934").
20
47 U.S.C. § 214 (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)). AT&T's
then-president testified before Congress during hearings on
the 1934 Act that Section 214 was designed "to take provisions of the present law that are applicable only to railroads
and apply them to telephone companies." A Bill to Providefor
the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communicationsby Wire or
Radio andfor Other Purposes: Hearingson S. 2910 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73rd Cong. 88 (1934) (statement of Walter S. Gifford, President, AT&T) (1934).
21
See Nat'l. Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 210 (1943) (discussing history of radio regulation).
22
See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1923); see also United States v. Zenith Radio Comm., 12
F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (The 1912 Radio Act did not grant
Secretary of Commerce authority to promulgate rules for the
exclusive assignment of frequencies).
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such "in the public interest." 23 In 1925, the
Fourth National Radio Conference endorsed the
public interest concept and recommended legislation incorporating it.24
In 1926, the Attorney General opined that the
Secretary of Commerce also had no authority
under the Radio Act of 1912 to regulate radio stations' power, frequency or hours of operation
and, at that point, the Secretary dropped all efforts to regulate radio.25 In response to the resultant chaos, Congress passed the Radio Act of
1927,26 which created the Federal Radio Commission and conferred upon that Commission the authority to grant or deny applications for station
licenses as well as for the renewal or modification
of such licenses as the public interest, convenience, and necessity might require.27 The "basic
provisions" of the 1927 Act were "incorporated"
into the Communications Act of 1934.28 Like the
Federal Radio Commission, the criteria governing
the then new FCC's licensing power was the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." 29

The "public interest" standard is used by Congress where an agency is to implement major
goals and policy objectives within the agency's domain.30 Thus, Congress has incorporated the
"public interest" into a variety of different statutes
and for a variety of different purposes.31 For example, the Communications Act of 1934 requires
the agency to grant common carrier and radio
licenses only when such licenses are consistent
with the public interest. 32
The term, "public interest, convenience, and
necessity," is not defined in the 1934 Act.33 The
Supreme Court, however, has characterized the
public interest touchstone of the Communications Act as a "supple instrument" granting broad
powers to its wielder.34 The Court held that those
powers call for "imaginative interpretation"35 and
dispense broad authority to the FCC to act as an
"overseer" and "guardian" of the public interest.3 6

23
See Robinson, supra note 11, at 3, 9 (noting repeated
iterations of that idea by the secretary).
24 Id. The Conference did, however, reject the view that
radio stations were public utilities. Id.
25
See Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212.

1996) (permitting Attorney General "for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest" to parole into the United States
any alien applying for admission); Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 44709(b) (1) (A), (b) (2) (1994) (allowing FAA to
suspend airman's certification as required by safety in air

26
See 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications § 158 (1974); see
also Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 213. See also Federal Radio

transportation and the "public interest"); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11324(c) (1994) (permitting railroad

Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933); Technical Radio Lab. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n., 36
F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
27
Some variation of "public interest, convenience or necessity" appears throughout the Radio Act of 1927. See Radio
Act of 1927, ch. 169 §§ 4(F), 9, 11, 21, 44 Stat. 1162.
28
See Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 213. See also FCC v.
Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) ("In its essentials the Communications Act of 1934 [with respect to radio]
derives from the Federal Radio Act of 1927."); see also 47
U.S.C. § 307 (1994).
29
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a), 310(b) (4), 310(d)
(1994).
30
See Donna Morris Duvall, Comment, Moving Toward a
Better-Defined Standard of Public Interest in Administrative Decisions To Suspend Government Contractors,36 AM. U.L. REV. 693,
700 n.47 (Spring 1987) (citing RicHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.5.1, at 381 (1985)).
31
The "public interest" is a hallmark of many regulatory
statutes. Some general examples include: Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (1994) (emphasizing that the Federal
Power Commission may authorize the issuance of a security
by a public utility "only if it finds that such issue .

.

. is for

some lawful object ... and compatible with the public interest . . . ."); Motor Carriers Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13702(b) (5)
(1994) (allowing ICC to grant various forms of relief from
filing requirements when relief is "consistent with the public
interest and the transportation policy."); Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d) (5) (A) (West Supp.

III.

BROAD POWERS GRANTED UNDER
THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" RUBRIC

mergers if consistent with the public interest). See also The
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(noting that SEC has the authority in registering an exchange or association of brokers to consider whether its rules
"generally . . . protect investors and [the] public interest)

(citing, inter alia, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78f(b) (5), 78o-3(b) (6)
(1994 & Supp. 1996)).

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a) (common carriers), 307(a)
(station license), 309(a) (West Supp. 1996).
33
See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593
(1981).
34
Id. at 593 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309
U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (the public interest "serves as a supple
instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy")); see also Nat'l. Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) (holding that "public interest" confers broad powers
upon the FCC). See also Public Util. Comm'n. of Cal. v.
FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating in part that
the "public interest" standard grants broad powers to FERC).
35
See FCC v. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953)
("The statutory standard [of the public interest] no doubt
leaves wide discretion and calls for imaginative interpretation.").
36
See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973); see also Nat'l. Cable Television Ass'n v. United States,
415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974) ("There is no doubt that the main
function of the Commission is to safeguard the public interest[.]").
32
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Although extensive, the "public interest" standard
is not limitless; the Court has held that the public
interest does not give administrative agencies a
"broad license to promote the gen-
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rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service."39 The public
interest standard gives the Commission "broad
discretion" in determining how that goal is
achieved. 40 For that reason, courts are required
to give "substantial judicial deference" to the
Commission's 'judgment regarding how the public interest is best served." 41 Thus, courts have upheld the Commission's use of its "public interest"
powers in numerous instances, including the
Commission's creation of a policy to require reciprocity in its consideration of international common carrier questions4 2 and its promulgation of
rules generally prohibiting telephone companies
from providing cable service in their telephone
service areas.4 3 Other examples of the Commission's use of its "broad" public interest powers in
the common carrier arena include (1) the estab-

lishment of a policy favoring the entry of new
common carriers in the specialized communications field" and (2) the requirement that telephone carriers furnish certain interconnection facilities to specialized common carriers. 45
With respect to radio regulation, the courts
have been similarly lenient of the Commission's
public interest powers. 46 For example, the "public interest" has been considered "sufficiently
broad" to allow the Commission to consider applicants' past or proposed violations of criminal statutes.4 7 In National Broadcasting Company, the
Court upheld the Commission's authority to issue
chain broadcasting regulations on the grounds
that the Act's public interest powers do not limit
the Commission to the role of "traffic officer," but
instead extend beyond engineering and technical
aspects of radio regulation. 48 The Court has also
held that "questions of procedure in ascertaining
the public interest, when the Commission's licensing authority is invoked ... were explicitly and by
implication left to the Commission's own devising."4 9
There is nothing atypical about the Commission enjoying broad powers under its public interest authorization. For example, courts have
reached similar conclusions with respect to the
scope of the ICC's public interest powers.50 Also,

See NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976).
Id. at 670 (explaining that the public interest derives
its content and meaning from "the purposes that Congress
had in mind when it enact[s] legislation."); Public Util.
Comm'n of Cal., 900 F.2d at 281. See also Western Union Div.
v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 324, 335 (D.D.C. 1949) ("The
standard of 'public convenience and necessity' is to be so
construed as to secure for the public the broad aims of the
Communications Act."), aff'd 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981).
40 The D.C. Circuit has said that Congress "[i]n lieu of
specific legislative directives" gave the Commission the power
to act according to its view of the "public interest." See Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
707 F.2d 1413, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Accord General Tel.
Co. of the Southwest v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846, 853,858 (5th Cir.
1971) (explaining that the public interest standard of the
Communications Act grants "elastic powers" to the Commission and "is to be construed so as to secure for the public the
broad aims of the Communications Act."); Washington Util.
and Transp. Comm'n. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir.
1974).
41
See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596
(1981) (citations omitted).
42 See Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1384,
1389 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 449
(1967) (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e) (West Supp. 1996)) (explaining that the Anadromous Fish Act permits FPC to con-

sider environmental and conservation issues even absent explicit authority to do so in FPC's enabling acts).
43 See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States,
449 F.2d 846, 858 (5th Cir. 1971) ("We feel the public interest is sufficiently broad to permit the Commission to issue
these rules" prohibiting telephone companies from furnishing cable service in their telephone service areas.).
44 Wash. Util. and Transp. Comm'n. v. FCC, 513 F.2d
1142 (9th Cir. 1974).
45
See Bell Tel. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1270-73 (3rd
Cir. 1974).
46 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38
(1940) ("public ... interest" touchstone is as "concrete as the
complicated factors forjudgment in such a field of delegated
authority permit"). But see FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689 (1979) (striking down FCC's rules requiring cable
systems to make certain channels available to third parties).
47 See FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 289-90 n.7 (1954).
48 See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 215-160 (1943). This position represented a change in
the Court's views as it had originally thwarted attempts to expand the meaning of regulation in the public interest. See
also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)
(public interest did not permit FCC to consider economic
impact on existing licensees in determining whether to grant
a new license).
49
Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 138.
50 See ICC v. Ry. Labors Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373
(1942) (reversing ICC's decision that it lacked authority

eral . . . welfare."3 7 Rather, the exact shape and

breadth of an agency's public interest authority
varies with the aims and goals of the given statute
in which the public interest provision is lodged.38
The chief goal of the 1934 Act is to "make available .

37

38

.

. to all people of the United States . .. a
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the public interest has been held to allow agencies to impose conditions on the grant of licenses
where such conditions were within the scope of
the agency's enabling act. Thus, the ICC,51
FERC, 5 2 and the FCC53 have all been found to
have liberal authority to condition the granting of
licenses in accordance with the public interest
standard. In summary, the courts have found repeatedly that the grant of "public interest" authority to an administrative agency conveys broad powers to the agency to act in accordance with both
the goals of the agency's organic statue and the
statutory provisions bequeathing the "public interest" powers to the agency.
IV.
A.

SECTION 271
BOC Entry Provisions

It is well-established that the interpretation of a
statute begins with its plain language. 5 4 By its
terms, Section 271 permits a BOC to offer longdistance services within its home region.55 More
technically, it allows BOCs to provide "interLATA
services originating in any of its in-region
States."5 6 Section 271 therefore allows BOCs to
offer both local exchange and long-distance servunder the "public interest" standard to issue rules for the
protection of fired employees). See also Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42 (1931) (upholding
ICC's authority to issue new railroad licenses provided that
the new service was in the public interest).
51
52

See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. at 376-77.

See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties,
382 U.S. 223 (1965) (authority to condition certificates
where warranted by the public convenience and necessity
permits agency to require regulatees to make appropriate refunds); see also Atlantic Refining Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n.,
360 U.S. 738 (1959).
53 See Western Union Tel. v. United States, 87 F. Supp.
324, 355 (D.D.C. 1949) (FCC's power to impose conditions
in accordance with the public convenience and necessity pursuant to Section 214 encompasses conditions requiring a
waiver of private contractual rights).
54 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see
also Catholic Social Svs. v. Meese, 664 F. Supp. 1378, 1383
(E.D. Cal. 1987) ("[T]he first step in statutory construction is
application of the plain meaning rule.").
55
Section 271's scope is limited to BOC provision of
long-distance services to customers located in states in which
the BOC was authorized to provide service pursuant to the
MFJ, as amended. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(i) (West Supp.
1996). The BOCs were permitted to offer long-distance services outside of their home region upon enactment of the
1996 Telecommunications Act. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (2)
(West Supp. 1996).
56
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (1). Pursuant to the Modification of Final Judgment, the continental United States was
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ices to the BOC's local exchange customers.57
However, to ensure that the BOCs do not abuse
their market power in the local exchange market
against long-distance competitors, Congress
placed various safeguards in Section 271 which
must be satisfied in order for a BOC to provide inregion long-distance services.56
For example, BOCs must apply to, and obtain
authorization from, the Commission as a prerequisite to providing in-region interLATA services.59
Such applications are to be made on a state-bystate basis.60 Prior to making any determination
on a BOC's application, the Commission must
consult with the Department of Justice and the
appropriate State public utility commission concerning the BOC's application.6 1 Pursuant to the
statute, the Justice Department is permitted to review Section 271 applications under "any standard
the Attorney General considers appropriate" and
such evaluation must be accorded "substantial
weight by the Commission."62
Aside from the above consultations, Commission approval is predicated on a determination
that: (1) the applicant-BOC provides access and
interconnection to its network facilities to a facilities-based competitor;63 (2) the BOC's agreedivided into local access and transport areas ("LATAs") in
which only a specified BOC was permitted to provide telecommunications services (i.e., intraLATA services). See NonAccounting Safeguards Notice, supra note 3. LATAs are much

larger than the area in which a local call may be made. Id.
57

See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 2,

para. 7.
58
The Commission previously detailed some of the
methods by which BOCs could abuse their power when providing in-region long-distance services. See Non-Accounting
Safeguards Notice, supra note 3, paras. 5-8.

59

See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 271(b), 271(d) (West Supp. 1996);

see also AT&T Corp.- Production of Section 271 Documents, CC

Docket, Order DA 96-1750 para. 4 (1996) (Section 271 permits the Bell companies to provide in-region long-distance
services "if the Commission finds that certain conditions have
been met.").
60
See FCC Public Notice, Procedures For Bell Operating
Company Applications Under New Section 271 Of The Communications Act, (Dec. 6, 1996); see also Jonathan E. Canis
and Enrico C. Soriano, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A
Global Analysis, 4 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 147, 151-52 (Winter

1996).
61 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (2) (West Supp. 1996). See
also Non-Accounting Safeguards Notice, supra note 3, at para. 10.

See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
A facilities-based competitor is a carrier providing telephone exchange service either exclusively over its own facilities or predominantly over its own facilities in combination
with resale of another carrier's services. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (c)
(1) (A) (West Supp. 1996). As noted in the Conference Re62
63
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ments with local exchange competitors satisfy the
fourteen points of the competitive checklist contained in Section 271 (c) (2) (B) ;64 (3) the requested authorization will be carried out in accordance with the separate subsidiary and
nondiscrimination requirements of Section 272;
65 and (4) "the requested authorization is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity." 66 Although Section 271 (d) (3) (C) obligates the Commission to grant only those
applications consistent with the "public interest,"
Section 271 (d) (4) provides expressly that the
"Commission may not, by rule or otherwise, limit
or extend the terms used in the competitive
checklist .... ."67
B.

Plain Language Analysis

Although a superficial reading of the public interest and non-alteration provisions might suggest
some tension between them, a deeper analysis
reveals no such conflict. Section 271 (d)'s plain
language contains, among other things, two distinct commands; the first, Section 271(d) (3) (C),
requires the Commission to grant only those applications that are consistent with the public interest, while the second, Section (d) (4), forbids the
agency from altering the competitive checklist
"set forth in subsection C(2) (B)." Notably, the

no-alteration provision does not reach the "facilities-based" competitor provisions of subsection
port, Congress saw cable companies as the most likely candidate to become facilities-based competitors. See S. REP. No.
104-230, at 148 (1996); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, at 77
(1995) (The "Committee notes that the cable industry .. . is
expected to provide meaningful facilities based competition
. . . ."). Likewise, the Chairman of the House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee, Rep. Fields, also made
repeated statements indicating that cable companies were
considered the most likely facilities-based competitor. See,
e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H8281, 8284 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995)
(Telephone companies must "enter a good faith negotiation
with a facilities-based competitor, like a cable company.");
141 CONG. REc. H8460, 8476 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) ("The
checklist in Title I envisions a facilities-based competitor .. . .
The cable companies are ready to be that competitor."). If
the BOC does not face a facilities-based competitor, it may,
under certain circumstances, satisfy that requirement by
proffering a statement of its general terms and conditions for
such access and interconnection. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (3)
(A) (ii) (requiring compliance with Section 271(c) (1) (B)).
However, as discussed below, there are strong public interest
considerations weighing against permitting a BOC to enter
the in-region long-distance market under this provision. See
infra Part VI (discussing importance of actual local exchange
competitors to temper BOC's ability to commit anticompeti-
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(c) (1) (A) and (B) or the separate affiliate requirements of Section 272. Yet, both of those requirements must be satisfied for a Section 271 application to be granted. Consequently, the noalteration provision does not circumscribe the
Commission's public interest authority with respect to the presence (or lack thereof) of facilities-based competitors or to the sufficiency of the
BOC's compliance with the separate affiliate safeguards of Section 272.
As for the competitive checklist, it sets forth the
minimum requirements which BOCs must provide to competitors in order for the BOC to be
eligible, assuming all other requirements are met,
to receive Section 271 authority.68 The no-alteration provision simply precludes the Commission
from raising the floor for all BOC Section 271 applications. Nowhere in Section 271 is there language stating to the effect that the Commission
may not, on a case-by-case basis, impose additional requirements where necessary to render a
Section 271 application consistent with the public
interest. Instead, the plain language binds the
Commission to grant only those applications consistent with the public interest.
That the Commission may impose additional
conditions where warranted by the public interest
is supported by reading Section 271 through the
lens of certain bedrock canons of statutory construction. Foremost, statutes are to be read in
their entirety so that no part is rendered mere surtive acts in the long-distance market). Additionally, this provision was designed to operate only where "no qualifying facilities-based competitor has requested access and
interconnection .. . by the date that is 3 months prior to the
date that the BOC seeks interLATA authorization." See S.
REP. No. 104-230, at 148 (1996). Generally, IXCs will have
requested such access thereby limiting BOC interLATA entry
to the procedures in Section 271(c) (1) (A). See 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 271(c) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
64 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1996); see
also supra note 4.
65
66

47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (3) (B) (West Supp. 1996).
47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (3) (C) (West Supp. 1996); see

also Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 3, at pa-

ras. 331, 336 (The Commission must find that BOC entry
into the in-region interLATA market is, among other things,
"consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.").
67 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (4) (West Supp. 1996).
68
See S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 144 (1996) ("The competitive checklist is .. . [what] at a minimum, [must] be provided
by a BOC in any interconnection agreement approved under
Section 251 .

.

. before the Commission may authorize the

BOC to provide in region interLATA services.").

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1997]

plusage.69 The above view, that the Commission
may impose conditions on an ad-hoc basis, but
may not do so across the board, accords with that
canon. In contrast, the BOCs view7 o - that the
FCC is powerless to impose any public interest
conditions outside of those contained in the statute -flies in the face of that precedent:
To read out of a statutory provision, a clause setting
forth a specific condition [such as one requiring grant
of only those applications that are consistent with the
public interest, convenience, and necessity] is an entirely unacceptable method of construing statutes. 7 1

Consequently, a construction of Section 271
which emasculates the public interest requirement is especially impermissible. 7 2
Further undercutting the BOCs' reading of Section 271 is the fact that their construction, essentially precluding the FCC from acting on public
interest considerations outside of the express requirements of the checklist, contravenes the language of the Justice Department consultation provisions

contained

in Section

271 (d) (2) (A).

That provision, on its face, (1) permits the Justice
Department to evaluate Section 271 applications
under "any standard the Attorney General considers appropriate" including, therefore, public interest standards and (2) requires the Commission
69 See 2A Sutherland, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON§ 46.06 at 119 (5th ed. 1992 rev.); see also Astoria

STRUCrION,

Fed'l Say. & Loan v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)
(Courts must "construe statutes, where possible, so as to
avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof.").
70 See supra notes 7, 8.
71 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822
F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing 2A Sutherland, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION at 46.05, 46.06 (C. Sands
rev. 4th ed. 1984)).
72 See Pennsylvania Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) ("Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provisions so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment."); see alo Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) (all words in a
statute are to have meaning).
73 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 271(d) (2) (A), 110 Stat. 56, 89 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 271(d) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996)).
74 Id.
75 The legislative history also undercuts the BOCs' arguments. The Conference Report observed that the Justice Department was permitted to evaluate Section 271 applications
under "any appropriate standard" and included three specific examples, all of which allowed for public interest components. Conference Report, supra note 2, at 149 (permitting
evaluation pursuant to: (1) whether there is "a dangerous
probability" that the BOC could impede competition in. the
long-distance market the BOC seeks to enter; (2) whether
there is "no substantial possibility" of such obstruction; or (3)
"any other standard the Attorney General deems appropri-
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to accord "substantial weight" to the Department's evaluation. 74 It would be nonsensical of
Congress to have enacted a statute which (1) permits the Justice Department's evaluation to encompass public interest considerations and (2) requires the Commission to place substantial weight
on that evaluation, but which then (3) precludes
the Commission from taking action on the Department's evaluation to the extent the evaluation
is based on public interest considerations outside
of the checklist. 75
If the BOCs are correct that the public interest
is to be interpreted narrowly, then there would be
little reason for Congress to have required the
Commission to consult with the Justice Department, even less reason for Congress to have given
the Justice Department the authority to analyze
Section 271 applications under whatever rubric
the Department deems appropriate, and no reason forJudge Greene to have held that the Justice
Department was entitled to retain and share with
the FCC any documents which it obtained pursuant to the consent decree that are "relevant to the
FCC's new responsibilities" under Section 271.76
Moreover, the BOCs' strained reading eliminates
entirely the Department's ability to use "any stanate."). Furthermore, several members of the House stated
specifically that the purpose of the Commission's consultation with the Department of Justice was to help determine
whether the grant of the Section 271 application was consistent with the public interest. See 142 CONG. REc. H1165
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Berman) ("The
FCC must consult with the Attorney General in determining
whether RBOC entry is in the public interest, a requirement
designed to ensure that the FCC gives proper regard to the
Justice Department's special expertise in competition matters
and in making judgments regarding the likely marketplace
effects of RBOC entry into the competitive long-distance
markets."); Id. at H1171 (statement of Rep. Conyers); see id.
at H1175 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (The "Attorney General's evaluation does not have a preclusive effect on the
FCC." The "FCC is free to give substantial weight - indeed
greater weight if justified by the proffer to the evidence offered by the applicant, Bell operating company. This is also
true both of the conclusions and the recommendations concerning public interest, convenience and necessity or concerning competitive issues.").
76 See U.S. v. Western Elec. Co., 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1388 (1996). Judge Greene issued his ruling over the objections of several BOCs, explaining that "Congress contemplated that the FCC would have ready access to information
in the Department's possession" and that such materials may
be used by the Commission in making its Section 271 determinations or for "any other section of the Act that requires
... a competitive analysis." Id. at 1389. Under Section 271's
plain language, the public interest is part of the Commission's competitive analysis.
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dard" because it effectively forces the Department
to use only those standards upon which the FCC
may act. Thus, the BOCs' construction cannot be
squared with the statute's plain language.77 The
only sensible reading of the Justice Department
consultation provision is that it requires the Commission to place "substantial weight" on findings
made by the Justice Department, no matter what
criteria the Department employs, including that
of the public interest. This very construction has
been adopted by the Department of Justice.78
Further supporting the Commission's authority
to go beyond the checklist in individual cases is
the canon holding that Congress preemptively
knows the meaning of the words which it uses.
The Supreme Court has held that,
where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of
ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."

As discussed in Part III, the term "public interest"
has a rich history of conveying broad powers to
regulatory agencies.80 Consequently, Congress is
presumed to have intended the "public interest"
to bequeath its usual meaning to the Commission.81
Finally, had Congress desired that the Commission consider only a narrow range of issues when
conducting its public interest analysis, it could
have designed the statute in a manner providing
77 See Pennsylvania Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) ("Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.").
78 The Justice Department has released a letter reiterating its authority to "evaluate individual applications under
any standard we consider appropriate" and seeking comment
on five general factors pertaining to BOC entry into in-region long-distance, all of which impact upon the public interest. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, to All Interested Parties (Nov. 11, 1996) [hereinaf-

ter justice Department Letter] (seeking comment on the various

benefits and harms from BOC entry into long-distance).
Likewise, David Turetsky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Civil and Regulatory Affairs, has stated that the public interest "allows full consideration of all competitive issues" and
that neither the FCC nor the Department is limited in terms
of the issues which they may consider under the public interest test. See FCC Videotape, supra note 8. See also 142 CONG.

Rrc. H1178 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (expressing the view that "the FCC will not take actions
that, in the Justice Department's view, would be harmful to
competition.").
79 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
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such specificity. Congress is certainly no stranger
to such provisions. In the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act ("FLPMA"), for example,
Congress permitted the Secretaries of Agriculture
and Interior to trade any public lands for other
land, where the Secretary concerned determines
that the public interest will be well served by making the exchange:
Provided, That when considering public interest the
Secretary concerned shall give full consideration to better Federal land management and the needs of State
and local people, including needs for lands for the
economy, community expansion, recreation areas,
food, fiber, minerals, and fish and wildlife and the Secretary concerned finds that the values and the objectives which Federal lands or interests to be conveyed
may serve if retained in Federal ownership are not
more than the values of the non-Federal lands or interests and the public objectives they could serve if ac82
quired.

Instead of providing similar specificity, Section
27lobligates the Commission to review the
broader "public interest" (and all that term entails) prior to granting a BOC's application.
Thus, the BOCs' interpretation of Section 271
cannot stand. Rather, the statute plainly requires
that the Commission have the authority to impose
conditions required by the public interest, so long
as the agency does not attempt to place such conditions on all Section 271 applications, thereby
impermissibly altering the checklist. Such a reading would give effect to both the public interest
and no-alteration provisions.83

See also McDermott Int'l., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342
(1991) (courts presume that when using terms of art, Congress intends for them to have their established meaning).
80

See supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.

81 As discussed infra notes 84-115 and accompanying
text, Congress was well aware of the broad powers conveyed
through the grant of "public interest" powers to regulatory
agencies.
82 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1716(a) (West 1995). The Bank
Holding Company Act is another example in which Congress
provided specific guidance for the analysis of the public interest. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (8) (1994) (permitting banks
to acquire non-banking enterprises where "performance by
an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected
to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration
of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices.") Id.
83
See United States Dep't. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S.
491, 504 n.6 (1993) (noting that a court should "give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute." (quoting
Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883).).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

V.

The legislative history reveals that Congress
purposely and with full knowledge of the consequences gave the Commission the statutory responsibility to review Section 271 applications in
light of the public interest. In promulgating the
BOC application procedures of Section 271, Congress rejected the House bill8 4 which did not expressly confer any confer any public interest authority to the Commission 5 in favor of the Senate
Bill which did. 8 6 That choice was deliberate; Congress was aware of the differences between the two
bills, 8 7 but nonetheless adopted the Senate provision requiring satisfaction of the public interest as
a distinct element of Commission approval. 8
Congress' decision to favor the Senate bill over
the House bill confirms Congress' desire for the
Commission to subject Section 271 applications to
a public interest review. 89
The above point is underscored by an examination of the origin of the public interest provision
in the Senate. The public interest provision
originated9 O in the Senate and, along with the bar
H R. 1555 was enacted by a vote of 305-117 on August
4, 1995.
85 See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 7-10 (1995). See aloJON
84

HEALEY, Rejecting FurtherRegulation, Senate Easily Passes Bill, 53

CONG. Q. 1727, 1730 (June 17, 1995) (detailing the differences between the House and Senate bills concerning the
FCC's public interest authority to scrutinize BOC entry).
86 See S 652, 104th Cong. (1995).
87 See Conference Report, supra note 2, at 149 ("[I]n new
Section 271(d), the conference agreement adopts the basic
structure of the Senate Bill concerning authorization of BOC
entry by the Commission .... .").
88 The Conference Report uses the conjunctive "and" to
make clear that the public interest is a separate component
to Section 271 approval. It provides that the Commission
may grant a Section 271 application "if the Commission finds
that the petitioning BOC has fully implemented the competitive checklist ... that the interLATA services will be provided
through a separate subsidiary .

.

. and that the provision of

the requested interLATA services is consistent with the public
interest . . . ." Conference Report, supra note 2, at 144-45 (em-

phasis added).
89 In MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 486,
498 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), the court held that the enactment of
a bill passed by the state Senate instead of a conflicting bill
passed by the House "indicates that the Tennessee legislature
did not intend the bill to include the provisions embodied in
the rejected amendment") (citing 2A Sands, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION, § 48.18 at 341). See also CardozaFonseca, supra note 54, at 442-43 ("Few principles of statutory
construction are more compelling than the proposition that
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.") (citations omitted).
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on altering the checklist, remained largely unchanged throughout the legislative process culminating in the adoption of Section 271.91
Although the Senate Commerce Committee Report ("Commerce Committee Report") endorsed
the notion that the FCC should not be permitted
to alter the checklist, 92 that same report also exhibited a strong commitment to the public interest standard, stating expressly that the public interest standard "is the bedrock of the 1934 Act
and the Committee does not change that underlying premise through the amendments contained
in this bill."93 That language clarifies Congress'
intent with respect to the public interest, namely,
that the FCC was to have broad powers akin to
those enjoyed under the 1934 Communications
Act. 9
That the Commission's public interest review
was to be something more than a mere rubberstamp of applications meeting the checklist is
demonstrated by the Senate's rejection of an
amendment by Senator McCain (R-AZ), which
would have eliminated the Commission's author-

90 See, e.g., Senate Commerce Comm. Discussion Draft at
89-96 (Mar. 23, 1995) (on file with the Senate Commerce
Committee); see also Senate Discussion Draft, 141 CONG. REC.
S4090 (Mar. 16, 1995). Unlike Section 271, the discussion
drafts' bar on altering the checklist preceded the subsection
detailing the process for Commission approval. See, Senate
Commerce Comm. Discussion Draft, at 95 (Mar. 23, 1995);
Senate Discussion Draft, 141 CONG. REc. S4090 (Mar. 16,
1995). The public interest requirement was the first requirement contained in the March 16, 1995 Senate Discussion
Draft, See 141 CONG. REc. S4090, and the third in the March
23, 1995 Commerce Committee Discussion Draft, see Commerce Comm. Discussion Draft, at 96.
91 See Senate Commerce Comm. Discussion Draft,
§ 221(a) (adding new Section 255(c) (2) (B)) (on file with
Senate Commerce Comm.); S.652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (as
reported by the Commerce Comm.) § 221 (a) (adding new
Section 255(c) (2) (B)); S.652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (as
passed by the Senate) § 221(a) (adding new Section 255(c)
(2) (B)) (June 15, 1995).
92 The Commerce Committee Report explains that Section 255(b) (the Senate predecessor to Section 271(d) (4)) is
intended to ensure that the "FCC is specifically prohibited

from limiting or extending the terms of the 'competitive
checklist."' See Senate Commerce Comm. Rep., S. REP. No.
104-23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (Mar. 30, 1995).
93 Id. at 44. In floor debates, Senator Pressler, Chairman
of the Commerce Committee reviewed the history of the
phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity" and the
broad powers typically granted pursuant to the use of that
phrase. See 141 CONG. REc. S7966-67.
94 That is particularly relevant for determining the scope
of the Commission's public interest authority. See infra notes
116-227 and accompanying text.
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ity to conduct a public interest review.9 5 Senator
McCain's amendment stripped out the public interest by providing that "[f] ull implementation of
the checklist . ..

shall be deemed in full satisfac-

tion of the public interest, convenience, and necessity requirements."9 6 The amendment was required, according to Senator McCain and his
supporters, because the public interest standard
would "negate the entire checklist"9 7 as it was an
"ill-defined, arbitrary standard" which would expand, rather than lessen, the Commission's authority.98 In short, the amendments' backers believed that, without the amendment, the Senate
bill permitted the Commission to use its public interest mandate to impose requirements on Section 271 applications in addition to those contained in the checklist.99
The amendment encountered significant opposition prior to its death by tabling.1 00 Senator
Pressler (R-SD), the Chair of the Commerce Committee, expressed his surprise that the public interest standard was under attack because it was
the "bedrock" of the Communications Act of 1934
and "the foundation of all common carrier regulation."10 1 Depriving the FCC of its traditional
public interest authority would, in Senator
95
It is well-established that "[w]here Congress includes
limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it
prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation
was not intended." See Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23-24 (1983); see also United States Ex. Rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1156 (3rd Cir. 1991). The Ninth
Circuit has applied this rule specifically to the Communications Act. See Century Southwest Cable Television, Inc. v.
CIIF Assocs., 33 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
argument that the 1984 Cable Act permitted a cable operator
to provide service to apartment buildings against the wishes
of the buildings' owners because Congress had dropped a
proposal which would have authorized such actions).
96
See 141 CONG. Rrc. S7960 (daily ed. June 8, 1995). See
also 141 CONG. REc. S79054 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain) (The FCC's public interest authority
"should be eliminated or at least amended so that compliance with the competitive checklist is deemed to be in compliance with the public interest test.").
97 See 141 CONG. REc. S7969 (daily ed. June 8, 1995)
(statement of Sen. McCain). Senator Craig made similar
statements. See e.g., Id. at S7964-65 (statement of Sen. Craig)
(The public interest standard would permit the Commission
to "block" BOCs from offering interLATA services even if the
BOC satisfied the competitive checklist.).
98 See 141 CONG. REc. S7960 (daily ed. June 8, 1995)
(statement of Sen. McCain). See also 141 CONG. REc. S7965
(daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Burns (R-MT))
(Public interest is in "the eye of the beholder."); 141 CONG.
REC. at 87976 (statement of Sen. Thomas, R-WY.) ("The public interest is a vague and subjective standard."); Id. at S7970
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Pressler's opinion, force the FCC to sanction action that it would otherwise have found inconsistent with the public interest. 102 Senator Pressler
also explained that it was highly unlikely that the
FCC would arbitrarily use the public interest standard to keep BOCs out of the long-distance market because the Commission's decisions were required to be supported by substantial evidence 103
and:
[t]he FCC's functions and powers are not open-ended.
The Communications Act specifies in some detail the
kinds of regulatory tasks authorized or required under
the act. In addition, the act specifies procedures to be
followed in performing these functions. Such delineations of authority and responsibility define the context
in which the public interest standard shall be applied.
By specifying procedures, the act sets further boundaries on the FCC's regulatory authority.
S. 652 is no different. The bill would require the
FCC to make two findings before granting a Bell company's application to provide interlATA telecommunications service: first, that the Bell operating company
has fully implemented the competitive checklist in new
Section 255(b) (2); second, that the interLATA services
will be provided through a separate affiliate that meets
the requirements of new Section 252. In addition, the
commission must determine that the requested authority is consistent with the public interest convenience,
and necessity ....
The FCC's public-interest review is constrained by
(statement of Sen. Packwood (R-OR)) (Public interest is
.,amorphous"); Id. at S7965 (statement of Sen. Craig) (The
public interest is "subjective" and "a standard that has no
standard").
99
Fueling further support for the McCain amendment
was the belief that the Commission would take years to complete its "public interest" review of each application, thereby
delaying BOC's ability to provide-region interLATA services.
See e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7964-65 (daily ed. June 8, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Craig) (It takes an "extraordinary time"
for the Commission to make a public interest determination); 141 CONG. REC. S7971 (daily ed. June 8, 1995 (statement of Sen. Packwood) (applicants will be "tie [d] up .. . for
years."); id. at S7967 (statement of Sen. Thomas) ("This public interest test will certainly cause unnecessary delays in the
deregulation of the telecommunications industry."). That aspect was dealt with in Section 271(d) (3) which requires that
the FCC issue a written decision granting or denying BOC
Section 271 applications within 90 days of receiving the application.
100 The amendment was tabled by a vote of 68 to 31. See
141 CONG. REc. S7971 (daily ed. June 8, 1995).
101 141 CONG. REc. S7966 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
102 See id. at S7966-97 ("Those who oppose public interest review would ask us to sanction action that the FCC affirmatively finds to be inconsistent with the public interest.
How could this be good policy?").
103 Id. at S7977 (characterizing the substantial evidence
standard as entailing "heightened judicial scrutiny").
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the statute providing the agency's authority. For example, the FCC is specifically prohibited from limiting or
extending the terms used in the competitive checklist.
In addition, the procedures established in S. 652 ensure
that the FCC cannot arbitrarily deny Bell company en1 04
try into new markets.

Other Senators also expressed strong disagreement with the elimination of the public interest
test. For example, Senator Stevens (R-AK) declared that Commission involvement was necessary to ensure proper scrutiny of the public interest, especially in terms of "whether or not anyone
is going to be harmed by the availability of the
new service . . . and under what conditions those

people are going to be harmed." 0 5 Senator Lott
(R-MS) opined that the "public interest" was "an
important part of putting together the [congressional] agreement on the entry test" and that,
once a BOC meets the checklist requirements,
"there is this one additional thing, the public interest."1 0 6 He explained that the public interest
test "was important to make sure that we have a
fair and level playing field" between BOCs and
their local exchange and long-distance competitors.10 7 Senator Hollings (D-SC) maintained that
the removal of the public interest standard would
permit abuses by the BOCs and would result in
public harm. 08 Senator Kerrey, (D-NE) expresId. at S7966-67.
Id. at S7962 (statement of Sen. Stevens); see also 141
CONG. REc. S8163 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Pressler) (consumers "are protected by the FCC with the
public interest necessity and convenience standard."). Senator Stevens also expressed his view that elimination of the
public interest standard would invite abuse and increased litigation. Id. at S7961-62.
106 141 CONG. REc. S7969 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Lott) ("In my opinion, [the public interest] is
sort of part of the checklist.").
107
Id. (statement of Sen. Lott).
108 Id. at S7963 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hollings).
109 Id. at S7970 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Kerrey) (The public interest test "is an effort to make
certain that in fact we do get competition at the local level.").
110 Several members of the House stated their belief that
the public interest was a requirement separate and apart
from satisfaction of the checklist. For example, Rep. Hastert,
believed that BOCs must meet the checklist and then the FCC
must determine entry is in the public interest. See 142 CONG.
RLc. H.1152 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996). See also 142 CONG. REc.
H.1165 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Berman)
(FCC must consult with Department ofJustice to determine
whether BOC entry is in the public interest); 142 CONG. REc.
H.1171 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
Representative Costello, who originally was opposed to the
House bill, voted in support of the bill because it required
the FCC to perform a public interest determination. 142
104
105
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sing similar sentiments, asserted that the public
interest test was integral to the advent of competition in the local market. 0 9 In short, senators opposing the McCain amendment believed that satisfaction of the public interest was separate and
distinct from compliance with the checklist and
other express requirements of Section 271.110
As shown, the legislative history demonstrates
that the public interest was meant to confer broad
powers upon the Commission." 1 Congress chose
the Senate bill conferring public interest powers
upon the Commission over a House bill which
contained no such express grant to the FCC. At
every turn, the Senate chose to include a public
interest provision despite ample opportunity to
do away with it. The Senate flatly rejected the McCain amendment which sought to narrow the
public interest such that satisfaction of the checklist was deemed to meet the public interest. 12 It
also rejected, by tabling an amendment by Senator Thurmond (R-SC) which retained the public
interest language but precluded the Commission
from conducting an antitrust analysis, instead giving that power to the Justice Department." 3 At
minimum, the Senate believed the public interest
conferred vast powers upon the FCC; that was cer-

CONG. REc. H.1176 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) ("I originally opposed the measure when it came before the House last August because I felt the manager's amendment weakened the
standards to promote effective competition and provide fair,
reasonable rates for consumers. I am pleased that the conference report includes a reasonable checklist of requirements and requires that a FCC public interest test be met
before applying for long-distance entry."). Id.
111 To ensure that the Commission did not abuse the
public interest standard, Congress required it to justify its decisions concerning Section 271 applications by "substantial
evidence" as opposed to the lesser arbitrary and capricious
standard. See Senate Commerce Comm. Rep., S. REP. No.
104-23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (Mar. 30, 1995).
112
Senator Pressler agreed that the rejection of the McCain amendment was a vote to preserve the public interest
test and that every Senator had been consulted in the crafting of the bill. See 141 CONG. REc. S 8220 (daily ed. June 13,
1995).
113 Senator Thurmond's amendment (#1265) was submitted for consideration onJune 5, 1995. See 141 CONG. REc.
S7972, 8001 (June 8, 1995). It was tabled by a vote of 57-43
on June 13, 1995. See 141 CONG. REc. S8225 (June 13, 1995).
In opposing the amendment, Senator Lott noted that "we
have already fought this battle. We had an amendment to
knock out the public interest finding [and it was defeated].
But we have the hurdle of the checklist, we have the State
regulators and we also have the public interest test. So that is
three hurdles already."). See 141 CONG. REc. S 8207 (daily
ed. June 13, 1995).
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tainly the view of those seeking to narrow the
Commission's public interest powers as well as the
belief of those favoring a public interest test. 1 1 4
Thus, it was relatively uncontroverted in the Congress that the public interest provision afforded
considerable powers to the Commission and constituted a separate and distinct factor which must
be satisfied prior to BOCs receiving Section 271
authorization.15

VI.

COMMISSION EXAMINATION OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST

A.

Requirement That Local Exchange Market
Be Examined

As an initial matter, there is some dispute concerning the proper scope of the Commission's
public interest powers under Section 271. Several
BOCs have asserted that the public interest analysis to be performed is limited to an examination
of the effects of BOC entry into the long-distance
market.1 16 In contrast, the interexchange carriers
("IXCs") and other parties have contended that
the Commission's public interest powers under
Section 271 are not so limited and that any such
Section 271 public interest analysis must encompass an assessment of competition in the local ex114
See 141 CONG. REc. S8165-66 (daily ed.June 12, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Gorton) (FCC's power in making its public interest determination concerning long-distance entry "is
essentially unlimited.").
115 See 142 CONG. REc. S688 (Feb. 1, 1996) (unanimous
consent for introduction of a table of resolved issues among
which was that BOC applications to provide in-region longdistance must be in the public interest).
116
See FCC Videotape, supra note 8, (Richard Wiley, partner of Wiley, Rein & Fielding contended that the FCC's public interest powers under Section 271 are limited to reviewing
the likely effects of BOC in-region entry into long-distance
and not on an assessment of the state of local competition).
See also Ameritech Illinois Legal Memorandum, supra note 8, at 26
("focus" of FCC's public interest inquiry is on "whether authorization under Section 271 would promote competition
and benefit long-distance users.").
117 The Telecommunications Carriers For Competition
which includes AT&T, MCI, LDDS Worldcom and Comptel,
have asserted that the Section 271 public interest analysis includes an analysis of local exchange competition. See, e.g.,
FCC Videotape, supra note 8; TELECOMM. REP., Provisions For
Bell's Entry Into In-Region InterLATA Markets Disputed By LECs,
IXCs, July 15, 1996). The Department of Justice has expressed similar views. See FCC Videotape, supra note 8; WARREN'S TELECOM REGULATIONS MONITOR, Telecom Industry Shows
Disagreement On RHC Entry Into Long-distance (July 15, 1996).
118 Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 2, at
para. 8.
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change market as well as in the interLATA market.' 17 The Commission has apparently endorsed
the IXC view, stating that Section 271 "links the
effective opening of competition in the local market with the timing of BOC entry into the longdistance market."Is As shown below, BOC entry
into interLATA markets necessarily requires an
appraisal of the level of competition in the local
exchange market.119
The D.C. Circuit has explained that when conducting an "analysis of what is in the 'public interest,"' the Commission must focus on "fulfilling
the congressional view of the public interest."120
Additionally, the assessment of whether a particular Section 271 application is consistent with the
public interest must be made against the backdrop of the new Telecommunications Act of
1996.121

That backdrop - discussed both above

and below - reveals a strong congressional preference that BOCs not be permitted into in-region
long-distance until competition not only exists in
the local exchange market, but also is sufficient to
render the BOCs incapable of leveraging their
power in the local exchange market to gain an anticompetitive advantage in the long-distance market.122 Nothing in Section 271's plain language is

119 Even if BOCs were correct in asserting that the public
interest showing was to focus on the long-distance market,
the Commission's public interest review must include an examination of both the benefits and harms of new BOC entry.
In order to assess the potential harms, the Commission
would need to understand whether the BOC had the ability
to unfairly leverage its power in the local exchange market
into the long-distance market. That evaluation requires the
Commission to examine the BOC's strength as compared to
its competitors in the local exchange market.
120 See Mobile Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1406
(D.C. Cir. 1995). See also Pub. Util. Comm'n. of Cal. v. FERC,
900 F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that "broad public interest standards" in the Communications Act are "limited to the 'purposes that Congress had in mind when it enacted this legislation.") (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 575, 611 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring)
(scope of agency's public interest powers is delineated by the
areas in which the agency has expertise)).
121 See Mobile Comm. Corp., 77 F.3d at 1406 (whether it
was in the public interest to impose an auction-based licensing fee upon a PCS applicant was to be determined in relationship to the new statutory amendments granting auction
authority to the FCC and not against the 1934 Act's more
typical public interest backdrop of comparative hearings).
122 See supra notes 84-115 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history). See also Non-Accounting Safeguards
Notice, supra note 3, at para. 5 (The 1996 Act permits BOCs to
enter the long-distance market if "they satisfy certain statu-
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to the contrary.' 23
The Conference Report notes that the 1996 Act
was aimed at "opening all telecommunications
markets to competition." 124 To ensure that competition takes root in the local exchange markets
and that the long-distance markets remain competitive, the Commission must be certain that
BOC entrants into long-distance lack the authority to use their market power in the local exchange to commit anticompetitive acts in the
long-distance market. 2 5 Consequently, Commission scrutinization of the local market is permitted under the 1996 Telecommunications Act.12 6
That conclusion is further supported by the
floor statements of several members of both
Houses. Senator Hollings, for example, stated:
The basic thrust of the bill is clear: competition is the
best regulator of the marketplace. Until that competition exists, monopoly providers of services must not be
able to exploit their monopoly power to the consumer's
disadvantage .... Telecommunications services should
be deregulated after, not before, markets become competitive.1 27

Senator Kerrey was even more explicit, noting
tory conditions that are intended to prevent them from improperly using their market power in the local exchange
market against their competitors in the interLATA telecommunications [market] .

.

. and if they have taken sufficient

steps to open their local exchange networks to competition.").
123 Certainly the prohibition on altering the checklist
cannot foreclose the agency from reviewing local competition levels given the fact that the Department of Justice is
permitted to conduct and is conducting such review, thereby
obligating the Commission to place "substantial weight"
upon its findings. See Justice Department Letter, supra note 78;
see also 142 CONG. REc. H1178 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of

Rep. Sensenbrenner) (expressing view that "the FCC will not
take actions that, in the Justice Department's view, would be
harmful to competition.").
124

See Conference Report, supra note 2, at 1.

Professor Lawrence A. Sullivan notes that if BOCs
.gain IX access while their local monopolies remain substantially intact" then "a great opportunity to open local markets
will be lost and RBOC IX entry, far from being a boon to IX
competition may lead to serious distortion in a now competi125

tive market." Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust Symposium: Antitrust Issues In The Telecommunications and Software Industries, 25

Sw. U. L. REv. 487, 490 (1996) (asserting that time for RBOC
entry is after not before the BOC's local monopoly erodes).
See id. at 493 ("Premature RBOC entry into IX would not enhance but might well reduce the current, aggressive IX price
competition.").
126 The Commission's powers under the public interest
standard are those which accord with Congress' intent in enacting the legislation bestowing such powers upon the
agency. See Mobile Comm. Corp., 77 F.3d 1399, 1406 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Pub. Util. Comm'n. of Cal., 900 F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir.

1990).
127

142

CONG.

REc. S688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (state-
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that the conference bill "had sufficient provisions
to ensure that the local telephone market was
open to competitors before the RBOCs entered
long-distance." 2 Similar sentiments were expressed by members of the House. Representative Bunning declared that "[w] e should not allow
the regional Bells into the long-distance market
until there is real competition in the local business and residential markets." 29 Likewise, Representative Forbes opined that "before any regional
Bell company enters the long-distance market,
there must be competition in its local market.
That is what fair competition is all about."130
On a practical level, it is difficult to understand
how a public interest analysis of BOC entry into
in-region long-distance could be made without an
3
It should be
examination of the local market.s'
indisputable that the public interest favors in
preventing BOCs from using their existing market
power in the local exchange to obtain an anticompetitive advantage in a competitive market such as
long-distance.13 2 As stated by the Commission's

ment of Sen. Hollings).
128
142 CONG. REc. S697 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Kerrey).
129
141 CONG. REc. H8458 (Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Bunning).
130
142 CONG. Rhc. E204 (Feb. 23, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Forbes).
131
The Justice Department has solicited comment concerning "the risks that the Bell Companies market power in
local markets could be used to hamper competition
in ... both local and long-distance services." Justice Department Letter, supra note 78.

132
Professor Robert Willig has recognized that BOC's
have "sharp economic incentives" to abuse their local market
power into the long-distance market" and that they have had
and will continue to have significant chances to harm competition in following their incentives. See Economic Forum: Antitrust and Economic Issues, Willig Transcript at 60-61 (Wash.
D.C. July 23, 1996) [hereinafter FCC Economic Forum]. One
particular example provided by Professor Willig is the BOCs'
ability to unfairly raise their long-distance rivals' costs (via imposition of extra charges) thereby allowing the BOCs to set
their prices below their rivals and gain market share or price
at the same level and reap higher profits. Id. at 66-68. Similarly, Nina Cornell, the former Chief of the FCC's Office of
Plans and Policies, has stated that BOCs' "technical discrimination" is "rampant." Id. at 103. Such discrimination includes the denial or slow rolling of provisioning and repair in
which the BOC takes a long time to provide or repair competitor's lines. See id. As examples, Cornell cited the following: (1) BOCs take from nine-13 months to build a co-location cage which takes a contractor only six hours; (2) wouldbe local entrants in Oregon and Washington have been told
by the LECs that there is no more capacity at the tandem, no
more ports, and no more trunk capacity; and (3) competitors
of US West and other BOCs have filed numerous complaints
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Chief Economist:
The BOCs'

incentives and ability to discriminate

against rivals in long-distance . . . depend on their mar-

ket power in the local bottleneck. If we can open up
the bottleneck and implement vigorous competition
there, then BOCs will have little or no incentive to raise
the costs of their long-distance partners - and if they do
so, those long-distance carriers and their customers will
have other choices, so the harm to consumers will be
limited. Thus, when there is enough competition in
what is now the local bottleneck, it will make good
sense to let the BOCs into complementary businesses
such as manufacturing and long-distance.13 3

Thus, a review of the competition levels in the
local exchange market is critical to understanding
the impact of BOC entry into long-distance and,
therefore, a necessary predicate to fulfilling Congress' goal of granting BOC Section 271 applications only when such applications are consistent
with the public interest.
Another important reason for reviewing competition levels in the local exchange market is the
fact that long-distance entry was designed by Conalleging that the BOCs are providing poor service to the competitors in terms of breakdowns, repair time, etc. Id. at 103116. To temper the BOCs' ability to "price squeeze" and
commit other forms of technical discrimination, the Commission promulgated separate affiliate and non-discrimination safeguards pursuant to Sections 271 and 272. See NonAccounting Safeguards Order, supra note 2.
133 JOSEPH FARREL,
Creating Local Competition, 49 FED.
COMM. L. J. 201, 207-08 (1996).
See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 2, at
134
para. 10.
135 The Wall Street Journal notes that competition in the
local market could lower rates by as much as 60%. SeeJohnJ.
Keller, Home Court: Local Markets Will Soon Be Hit By an Unfamiliar Force: Competition, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1996, at R14
(telecom. Supp.). Such a reduction would seriously impact
BOCs' profits from the local exchange market. Id.
136
See Testimony of Dr. Carl Shapiro on behalf of Sprint
before the Illinois Commerce Commission, Investigation Concerning Illinois Bell Telephone Co.'s Compliance with Section 271(c)
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Nov. 7, 1996, at 3 ("[N] o
monopolist [regulated or not] lightly relinquishes its dominant position.") [hereinafter Shapiro Testimony].
See 141 CONG. REc. H8282 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995)
137
(statement of Rep. Bliley) ("[t]he key to this bill is the creation of an incentive for the current monopolies to open their
markets to competition").
138
See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1995, Report and
Order, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1, para 55 (Aug. 8, 1996), appealed Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1360-61
(1996), motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996).
("[I] ncumbent LECs have no economic incentive, independent of the incentives set forth in Sections 271 and 274 of the
1996 Act, to provide potential competitors with opportunities
to interconnect with and make use of the incumbent LEC's
network and facilities.").
139 See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 15 (statement of Joe Farrell) (explaining that once a BOC has been
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gress as a reward for BOCs opening up their local
exchange markets to competition. As noted by
the Commission, the BOCs hold nearly 99.1% of
all local exchange revenues in their in-region
states. 134 Like most monopolists, the BOCs generally have nothing to gain by opening their markets to competition,135 however they do have
every incentive to hinder unfairly any new competition.' 3 6 Section 271, therefore, represents the
type of incentive regulation designed to change
the BOCs' behavioral calculus. That is, Congress
enacted Section 271 to provide BOCs with an incentive to open local exchange markets by rewarding them with the ability to provide in-region
long-distance services. 137 As recognized by the
Commission, 138 its chief economist, 139 other economists, 14 0 the major interexchange carriers, 14 1
cable companies,142 and by the BOCs themselves1 43 , there is little reason for the BOCs to
open their markets outside of the incentive of inpermitted into the long-distance market, it may be "less inclined to cooperate with opening up the [local exchange]
bottleneck.").
140 Former FCC Office of Plans and Policies Chief Nina
Cornell stated that interLATA entry is the only "carrot" the
agency possesses vis-A-vis local exchange competition. Id. at
113.
141
AT&T's Chairman has noted that LECs which are allowed to provide long-distance service, such as SNET, are
..not in a hurry to open up their local service monopoly." See
Local Competition: European and Local Phone Monopolies Delay
Competition, AT&T Chairman Allen Tells Connecticut Business
Leaders, EDGE, ON & ABOUT AT&T, Nov. 18, 1996. Similarly,
MCI's Chief Policy Counsel has stated that "if you let the
RBOCs into the long-distance market prematurely, their incentive to open local markets to competition is dramatically
reduced." See RBOCs Should Not Be Allowed To Enter Long-distance Market Until True Competition Exists For Local Markets, MCI
Says, Bus. WmRE, July 22, 1996; see also MCI's Legal Memorandum In Response To OrderInitiatingInvestigation before the Illinois
Commerce Commission, at 5-6 (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter MCI
Brief. On behalf of Sprint, Dr. Carl Shapiro, former deputy
assistant attorney general in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, observed that the only incentive a BOC
has to open up its local market is that, in exchange, the BOC
is permitted to provide interLATA services. See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 3.
142 See generally Comments of Time Warner Cable, to Notice of Inquiry in CC Docket No. 96-149, at 6-8 (August 15,
1996) ("[P]rior to the 1996 Act, BOCs had no incentive" to
open their local exchange to competitors.).
143 See generally Comments of SBC Comm. Inc., to Notice
oflnquiry in CC Dkt No. 96-98. Similarly, NYNEX has allowed
that it provides access to its network not simply because
"we're good guys," but in order to "get into new areas of business." See TELECOMM. REP., at 16 (Dec. 11, 1995) (quoting
William Allan, NYNEX, Vice-President for Regulatory Affairs). Analogously, Ameritech's CEO has observed that the
"big difference between us and [GTE] is they're already in
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terLATA entry.'4
It should be recognized that the reward of longdistance entry is not a universal panacea in terms
of curing the BOCs' anticompetitive behavior in
the local exchange market. The Wall Street Journal notes that the "Bells have slowed the spread of
local competition by dragging their feet in negotiating with AT&T and others" concerning entry
into the Bells' local markets.14 5 In Texas, Southwestern Bell is "resisting incursions" into its local
market by 'pitching a battle to delay the entrance
of the big long-distance companies' into the local
market. 1 4 6 Likewise, MCI has been thwarted by
Pacific Bell1 4 7 and U.S. West 48 in its attempts to
bring local competition to California and Minnesota. And, for more than a year, Ameritech has
managed to stall negotiations with Time Warner,
thereby preventing the cable company from providing local exchange service in Ohio.149
Nor are the Baby Bells unique. Many smaller
and medium-sized LECs, none of which are covered by the Section 271 limitations, are also attempting to fend off new local competition.15 0
GTE, the largest local phone company in the
country,15 1 and Southern New England Telephone Company ("SNET"), which serves the State
of Connecticut, essentially have refused to cooperate with prospective local exchange competitors.15 2 Moreover, for customers of such carriers,
local competition promises to be especially benelong-distance.

What's their incentive to cooperate."

See

Michael Mills, Holding the Line on Phone Rivaby, GTE Keeps Potential Competitors, Regulators' Price Guidelines at Bay, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at C12, C14.
144 William Irby of the Virginia State Corporation Com-

mission has noted that because the 1996 Act's long-distance
prohibitions apply only to BOCs, "[t]here's nothing in [Section 271] for [LECs such as GTE], so they're doing everything they can to fight competition." Id.
145
See Keller, supra note 135.
146
See generally Ann de Rouffignac, AT&T Breaking Barrier to Local Phone Competition, HOUSTON Bus.J., Dec. 13, 1996.
147 Among other things, PacBell has told customers signing up for MCI's service that MCI lacks the authority to provide local service, that the service is not available for several
months, that the customers should pay PacBell because it
owns the local network, that the customers must also use MCI
for long-distance, and that MCI's local service is not as reliable as PacBell's. See Karen Kaplan, The Cutting Edge, L. A.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at D3. More importantly, PacBell has
admitted that there might be some problems with the manner in which certain employees have handled competition
from MCI. Id.
148 U.S. West "want[s] to stall local competition as long
as possible while maximizing their ability to handle both local and long-distance . . . ." See Steve Alexander, US. West
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ficial. For example, customers of Alltel Corporation, which has 1.6 million customers in fourteen
states, pay $9 more per month for local service in
the suburbs of Houston, Texas, than do residents
of Houston, who are instead served by SBC Communications.15 3 Similarly, Frontier Corporation
of Genesse, Pennsylvania, charges an extra longdistance fee to certain small-town customers to
connect them to the town's lone high school. 154
In light of the above, it would surely frustrate
the goals of the 1996 Telecommunications Act to "open ... all telecommunications markets to
competition"1 5 5 - for the Commission's public interest analysis not to include scrutiny of the local
exchange market, because it is almost universally
recognized that the reward of long-distance entry
is the single most important regulatory tool in ensuring that competition takes root in the local exchange market.' 5 6 Consequently, for any given
state, BOC long-distance entry should be withheld
until the promise of Section 271 - significant
competition in the local exchange market - is realized.
B.

Suggested Factors To Be Analyzed
Concerning the Local Exchange Market

The Commission's public interest determination under Section 271 should include a weighing
of the potential benefits of having the BOC, as a
Seeks Change in Rules,

MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB.,

Nov.

23, 1996, at 1D.
149 See Local Competition: Time Warner Says Ameritech Deal
With MFS Will Not Satisf Competitive Checklist Requirement,
EDGE, ON & ABOUT AT&T, May 27, 1996.
150
Leslie Cauley, Why Phone Rivals Can't Get Into Some
Towns, WALL ST.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at Bl; see also FCC Economic

Forum, supra note 130, at 113 (statement of Nina Cornell).
151
Mills, supra note 143, at C12.
152

See also FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 113,

159. See also supra note 141 (noting GTE's recalcitrance).
153
Cauley, supra note 150, at Bi.
154

Id.

Joint Statement of the Comm'n. of Conf., S. CONF.
REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996); see also 141 CONG. REc. S8165
(daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) ("The
155

goal of the bill . . . is to create added competition in both

telephone fields, in both long-distance and in the local exchange."). The Eighth Circuit has also recognized that,"[i]n
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress enacted a
plan to alter the monopolistic structure of local telephone
service markets with an injection of competition."). See Iowa
Util. Bd. v. FCC, 4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1360 (1996).
156

See, e.g., FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 10-11

(statement of Joe Farrell).
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new entrant, in the long-distance market against
the potential harms created should the BOC leverage its monopoly power in the long-distance
market. The latter review should include an assessment of the level of competition in the local
exchange market, including scrutiny of the BOC's
treatment of competing local exchange carriers,
i.e., are the BOC's actions anticompetitive. In the
end, the Commission must determine that competition in the local exchange market is sufficient
to prevent BOCs from utilizing their power in the
local exchange to gain an unfair advantage in the
long-distance market.15 7
The question then arises as to how the Commission may determine that competition is in fact sufficient in order to temper the BOCs' ability to
commit anticompetitive acts. Such determination
should focus on, among other things, the following factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)

the type and quality of "access and interconnection" provided by the BOC to its local exchange
competitors;
the status of competing local exchange carriers,
i.e. are they actually providing local exchange
services;
the number of competing local exchange providers;
the ability of local exchange competitors to
compete with the BOC in terms of service offerings, scope of service, capitalization, etc.;
the extent to which the BOC's local exchange
competitors are or plan in the very near-term to
provide local exchange services over their own
networks;
the relationship between the BOC's access
charges and its costs; and
the amount of market share possessed by the
BOC's local exchange competitors both individually and in the aggregate.
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sion examine the type and quality of "access and
interconnection" provided by the BOC to its local
exchange competitors. Section 271 (d) (3) (A)
provides expressly that the BOC must show that
any interconnection agreement "fully implements" the competitive checklist.' 5 8 The Conference Report explains that the requirement that
the BOC "is providing 'access and interconnection' means that the competitor has implemented
the agreement and the competitor is operational."15 9 Experience teaches, however, that the
signing of an interconnection agreement does
not indicate the advent of actual competition.
For example, the first company to enter into an
interconnection agreement with Southwestern
Bell has been unable to actually enter and offer
residential services because of the Bell's high
prices on access to the last mile wire (between the
customers' home and the LEC's switch).'" Thus,
the public interest would therefore favor BOC entry when the BOC's interconnection agreements
have been fully implemented as exhibited by the
presence of competing local exchange competitors.' 6 ' Otherwise, neither the Commission nor
the relevant state commission will have the ability
to decide whether the BOC has provided appropriate access and interconnection to its competitors. 162
There are several additional reasons that the
public interest favors the presence of actual competing providers of local exchange services as opposed to carriers who have completed an interconnection agreement but who have not yet
entered the market or are in other similar formative stages.s63 That is not to say that the Commis-

The public interest mandates that the Commis157
See Reed E. Hundt, Chairman Federal Communications Commission, Speech before the Competition Policy Institute (Jan. 14, 1997) (FCC's decision on Section 271 applications "will, of course, turn in large part on whether the
[applicant's] local market is open to competition."). See also

Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust Symposium, supra note 125, at

531-32 (The "public interest will be poorly served" if BOCs
"gain IX entry with LX power intact.").
158
Section 271(c) (1) (B) permits the BOC to provide a
statement of generally offered terms and conditions for access and interconnection in lieu of facing a facilities-based
competitor, but such an option is available only where no
prospective providers of local exchange service have requested access and interconnection. Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 271(c) (1) (B), 110 Stat. 56
(coedified 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (1) (B) (West Supp. 1996).
The availability of this option is clarified by the fact that the
"predominance" element of Section 271 (c) (1) (A) applies
only to that subparagraph and thus, subparagraph (c) (1)

(B) would be inapplicable where a carrier providing local exchange services predominantly over its own network requests
interconnection.
159
Conference Report, supra note 2, at 148.
160
See Rouffignac, supra note 146.
161
In fairness to the BOCs, the Commission should institute rules to ensure that prospective local exchange competitors do not "game" the system by declining one or more of
the checklist requirements. Such rules could, for example,
permit BOCs to show that they have offered all checklist
items to competitors under reasonable terms and conditions
and the competitors have nonetheless chosen not to accept
the item or items.
162 Conference Report, supra note 2, at 148 (observing that
requiring local exchange competitors to be operational assists the appropriate State commission in its consultation and
the FCC in its factual determinations).
163
MCI and Sprint have noted the importance of this
factor in reducing the risks of BOC long-distance entry. See
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sion should give no heed to the imminence of various entrants into the local exchange market, but
the benefits stemming from competition - additional consumer choice, lower prices, product innovations, etc. - are best realized if competitive
pressures stem from actual competitors as compared to those still in the formative stages.164 Furthermore, a greater number of competing providers will increase the likelihood that some or all
such carriers are able to bring competitive pressures to bear on the BOC.' 65
The public interest also requires that all of the
BOC's local exchange competitors operate on as
level a playing field as possible with the BOC.
The BOCs have recognized the importance of
level playing fields in instances of BOC entry as
the fledgling competitor against powerful incumbents into telecommunications markets.166 The
BOCs' local exchange competitors must be able
to offer services similar to those provided by the
BOC. 167 Also, such similar services should be
available to wide numbers of consumers throughout the state.168 The Commission need not require that competitors offer service in every town
and hamlet within the state; rather, a significant
majority of citizens should have the immediate

ability to switch their local exchange service to a
provider of such services in competition with the
BOC. It is simply inconsistent with the public interest for the BOC to face competition from only
a few small competitors which are able to provide
local exchange service in only a narrow portion of
the state, or from competitors who are unable to
offer services comparable to those of the BOC. 1 69
Competition will not flourish where the BOC's
competitors are able to offer only inferior services
or where the BOC remains the sole local exchange carrier for large areas within the state.
To that end, the Commission should also look
into the identity of the competing local exchange
carriers in order to gauge their actual ability to
compete against the incumbent BOC. As noted,
Ameritech has asserted that it faces local exchange competition in Illinois from the entrance
of a single local exchange competitor with only
2,500 lines, as compared to the six million held by
Ameritech in that state.17 0 In contrast, the Commission's Chairman Reed E. Hundt has said that
local exchange competition will not develop until
the BOCs have signed interconnection agreements with large IXCs, such as AT&T or MCI. 7 1
It is these larger types of IXCs which have the abil-

MCI Brief supra note 139, at 32; Shapiro Testimony, supra note
136, at 12, 18 (noting that "a CLEC - actually providing service - is far more meaningful than a paper agreement that
has yet to be tested commercially.").
164
See Farrell, supra note 131, at 202. See also MCI Brief
supra note 141, at 29 ("If local competition is sparse and embryonic, it will not provide an adequate check on the BOC's

exerted by the competing local exchange carriers. See MCI
Brief supra note 141, at 32-33 ("[S]ervice is not equally available unless the CLEC can provide service within the same
amount of time at the same price as the BOC.").
168
See id. See also Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 12
(the more widespread local competition is permitted to be,
the greater the chance that that market will be competitive).
169 See MCI Brief supra note 141, at 32. Also of importance is the fact that Ameritech believes that the FCC lacks
the authority to require "viable local competition" in all major markets in a state as a condition precedent to Section 271
authority. See Ameritech Illinois Legal Memorandum In Response To Order Initiating Investigation, Illinois Commerce
Commission Investigation Concerning Illinois Bell Compliance With Section 271(c), at 28 (Sept. 27, 1996) (No. 960404). Although that view is rebutted in Section VI.C, infra,
of this article, Ameritech has already begun to take actions in
accordance with its belief. In Illinois, it has begun the process leading up to Section 271 approval even though the sole
local exchange carrier actually offering local service has but
2,500 access lines as compared to Ameritech's six million. See
Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 14. In that proceeding,
one of the two interconnection agreements negotiated by
Ameritech, neither of which was with one of the "BIG
THREE" IXCs, had not yet been approved by the State PUC.
Id.
170
See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 14.
171 See Hundt Says Interconnection Deals With AT&T, MCI
Needed For Real Competition, TELCO COMPETITION REP. (une
20, 1996) ("The only truly significant interconnection agreement for those interested in competition is one between
AT&T or MCI and one of the Bells.").

ability .

.

. to use its bottleneck power to stymie competi-

tion."); Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 6 ("[T]he introduction of competition into local exchange markets will generate substantial consumer benefits in the form of new
services and lower prices.").
165
See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 12 (observing
that "the greater the number of actual [competitors], the
more confident" one could be in assuming that workable
competition exists).
166 With respect to competition in open video systems,
the United States Telephone Association ("USTA"), which
represents the BOCs and other local exchange carriers, has
said that "parity of access is an essential pre-condition for
LECs to provide meaningful competition to incumbent cable
operators, due to concentration of control over vast portions
of . . . programming among a handful of vertically integrated
cable operators." See In re Implementation of Section 302 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 - Open Video Systems,
Third Report and Order and Second Order on Reconsideration, 4
Comm. Reg. (P&F) 380, para. 163 (1996). USTA's statement
is even more relevant here where new entrants will face a
market concentrated not among a handful of competitors
but in the hands of the incumbent monopolist BOC.
167
The more inferior competitors' service offerings are
in comparison to the BOC's, the less competitive pressures
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ity, financially, technically and otherwise, to best
compete with the BOCs, especially, as discussed in
Section VI.D, infra, in the provision of bundled
services. Ameritech's CEO has acknowledged this
truism, characterizing Chairman Hundt's remark
as "stating the obvious."1 7 2 Thus, all parties appropriately recognize that the public interest is
best served by a BOC facing actual competition
throughout the majority of the State from at least
one large local exchange competitor (in addition
to several smaller such competitors) able to provide services comparable to those offered by the
BOC.17 3
Another significant public interest factor is the
extent to which new entrants have constructed
their own network facilities. The importance of
facilities-based competitors is recognized in Section 271 (c) (1) (A), which expressly requires that
competing local exchange carriers provide service
exclusively, or at least "predominantly," over their
own network facilities before the BOC may qualify
for Section 271 entry. The public interest aspects
of this requirement are many. The more construction and the greater the sunk costs committed by competitors, (i.e., the more extensive the
competitors' networks, the more repair crews it
possesses, etc.) the more independent the competitor is from the BOC and the less successful the
BOC will be in attempting to commit anticompetitive acts.1 7 4 Furthermore, the more sunk investment by competitors, the more assurance that the
competitor intends to, and will be able to, compete successfully against the BOC.17 5 For that reaSee Notebaert Unruffled by Hundt's Interconnection Remark, TELECOMM. REP. Uune 24, 1996).
173 The Commission's chief economist has stated that
the above conditions are unlikely to occur for some time:
"[I]f the issue [of BOC interLATA entry] arises any time
soon, it also seems unlikely that the access market will [be]
very highly competitive with all or most consumers able to
switch readily among multiple access suppliers." See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 12 (statement of Joe Farrell).
174 As explained by Professor Willig, the "only one answer" to ensure competition in the local exchange market is
"facilities-based competition." FCC Economic Forum, supra
note 132, at 85 ("I really don't think the new environment,
without facilities-based competition, will be solving in any
substantial way the traditional problems that we see."). FCC
Economics Forum participants Professor Jerry Hausman of
MIT and Nina Cornell echoed Professor Willig's view that facilities-based competition is important for competition. See
id. at 130-31. See also Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 1213 (detailing the importance of facilities-based competition).
175 See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 15-16 (explaining the importance of sunken investments by prospective local exchange entrants).
172
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son, the House, in discussing the predecessor to
Section 271 (c) (1) (A), explained that requiring
an actual facilities-based competitor "that is providing service to residential and business subscribers" constituted "tangible affinnation that the local exchange is indeed open to competition."1 7 6
Hence, the public interest counsels in favor of the
presence of facilities-based carriers. In their absence, i.e., where most local exchange competitors
provide services by reselling the BOC's own network,177 greater local competition must be operating because resale generally "insulate [s]" BOCs
from the effects of actual facilities-based competition.178
Finally, the public interest requires some consideration of the BOC's access charges - the
amount paid by long-distance carriers to originate
and terminate traffic over the BOC's network.
The Wall Street Journal reports that access
charges make up as much as forty-five cents of
every dollar spent on long-distance.17 9 It is wellrecognized that BOC interconnection rates are
significantly above cost 1 8 0 and must be brought
down in order to prevent BOCs from discriminating against long-distance carriers. The FCC's
chief economist has explained that otherwise
BOCs may discriminate against their long-distance rivals by forcing them to pay more for access
than the costs incurred by the BOC, thereby permitting the BOC to price aggressively and gain telephone calls that would otherwise not have been
made."" Although access charge reform is cur-

176

H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 76-77 (1995).

177

See, e.g., Mike Mills, FormerAntitrust Official to Join LCI

of McLean, WASH. PosT, Jan. 4, 1997, at C2 ("LCI said that it

"plans to offer local service solely on a resale basis, rather
than building its own facilities.").
178 FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 14 (statement
of Robert Farrell). Sprint has echoed that view with respect
to BOC entry into long-distance, noting that to the extent the
BOC is "a reseller of long-distance services rather than a facilities-based competitor, its impact on long-distance markets is
less-pronounced." See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 8-9.
179 See Bryan Gruley, Lobbying Battle Looms as FCC Studies
Issue of Access Fees For Bell Networks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996,
at A3, Al l; see also RBOCs Should Not Be Allowed To Enter Longdistance Market Until True Competition Exists For Local Markets,
MCI Says, Bus. WIRE, July 22, 1996.
180 FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 9 (statement
of Robert Farrell) ("traffic-sensitive access charges . . . are

well-above incremental costs"); see also Bus. WIRE, supra note
179.
181 See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 10 (statement of Robert Farrell); Bus. WIRE, supra note 179 (BOCs
could use their unfair access charge advantage to substan-
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rently the subject of a Commission rulemaking, 182
the public interest does not permit the agency to
sit idle until completion of the proceeding. Instead, it compels the Commission to examine the
BOC's access charges in order to understand the
potential for anticompetitive pricing.18 3 Once the
rulemaking is complete, presumably the agency
will have a more bright-line test concerning access
charges.
After reviewing the above criteria - and any
other factors the FCC deems necessary to its public interest examination - the Commission must
decide if competition in the State is sufficient to
preclude the BOC from leveraging anticompetitively its market power in the local exchange market into the long-distance market. In making that
determination, the Commission should examine
the amount of market share obtained by the
BOC's local exchange competitors (the amount
lost by the BOC).,184 Should the Commission find
that the BOC's market share has fallen to less
than 33%, it could conclude safely that the BOC
no longer possesses substantial market power.185
The fact that no appreciable market share has
been lost is a strong signal that the BOC's power
in the local exchange market is unrestrained by
the current levels of competition. In those circumstances, the public interest should be construed to take a dim view of BOC entry.
However, the public interest could still be satisfied if the BOC demonstrated that, despite its
overwhelming market share, it was competitively
vulnerable. Professor Robert Willig argues that a
BOC could show competitive vulnerability by

demonstrating that (1) a 10% price increase by
the BOC would not be profitable because of "expansion of existing rivals or new entrants taking
away its business;" (2) there are multiple competitors in operation such that the market is not "conducive to implicit collusion;" (3) at least 90% of
end users have the ability to switch immediately to
one of the BOC's local exchange competitors;
and (4) the BOC lacks the ability to levy monopoly prices on those 10% of end users for whom
the BOC is the sole local exchange provider. 186Professor Willig's test could be further
strengthened by requiring the BOC to make its
demonstration by clear and convincing evidence.1 87 Incorporation of that standard into
Professor Willig's test should ensure that grant of
a Section 271 application where the BOC possesses a market share higher than 33% will not be
inconsistent with the public interest.

tially cut costs); see also RHCs and GTE Offer FCC Consensus
Position on Interconnection, WARREN's TELECOM REGULATION
MONITOR, Apr. 1, 1996 (expressing view of AT&T, CompTel,
LDDS and MCI that BOCs high access charges force competitors to pay more than the BOC does).

to constitute monopolization.).

182
In re Access Charge Reform, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Third Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry, 5

Comm. Reg. (P&F) 604 (1996).
183 FCC officials have acknowledged this fact. See Bryan
Gruley, Lobbying Battle Looms as FCC Studies Issue of Access Fees
ForBell Networks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996, at A3.
184 See Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Med. Serv. Ass'n of
Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984) (market share is a "primary determinant" in assessing market power).
185 Absent other factors, a 33% market share does not
demonstrate monopoly power. See Fineman v. Armstrong
World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1992) ("A significantly larger market share that 55 percent has been required
to demonstrate prima facie monopoly power."); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 489 (5th
Cir. 1984) (suggested a market share of at least fifty percent

Metric Measures Are Not De Facto
Impermissible

C.

As discussed above, the Commission may conclude that an individual BOC application is not
consistent with the public interest until such time
as certain 'metric measures' are satisfied.188 Such
measures could include any of the following type:
(1) the BOC facing competition in a certain portion of the state; (2) the BOC facing competition
with a set number of end-users; (3) the loss of a
designated amount of market share; or (4) the actual presence of a specified number of local exchange competitors. Ameritech, and presumably

186
187

See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 87-90.

The clear and convincing standard is higher than the
preponderance of evidence. It is the weight of "evidence
which 'produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief
or conviction as to the truth of the allegatipns sought to be
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue."' Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 285 n.11 (1990); see also Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68
F.3d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1995).
188 There should be no dispute over the FCC's authority
to condition Section 271 applications. Congress, in adopting
the Senate bill, recognized that it permitted the Commission
to "grant an application or any part of an application" so
long as the application was consistent with the public interest
and satisfied the other requirements of Section 271. See Conference Report, supra note 2, at 144-45; See also Section III, supra
(discussing power of agencies to condition applications).
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the other BOCs, believe that the imposition of the
above criteria, even if required to satisfy the public interest, is unlawful. That argument is predicated on the erroneous belief that Congress rejected the imposition of such "metric"
requirements and therefore such power is denied
to the Commission no matter what the circumstances.189
First, the BOCs place undue emphasis on Congress' supposed rejection of metric measurements
by the Commission. However, Congress did no
such thing. In the House, Representative Bunn's
amendment, requiring that BOCs compete with
at least one competitor which is able to provide
service to 10% of the BOC's customers, was ruled
out of order. No vote was therefore taken on the
merits of that amendment.190 In the Senate, Senator Kerrey offered an amendment which would
have required that BOCs enter into interconnection agreements with carriers capable of providing service to a "substantial number of business
and residential customers."' 9 ' Senator Stevens,
the only Senator to express opposition, fought the
amendment primarily because he believed the
amendment would make it more difficult for
small telecommunications carriers to enter the lo-

cal exchange market.19 2 He specifically noted
that the Kerrey amendment would result in the
Commission "delay [ing] a smaller company [from
entering the local exchange market] if there is another one coming through the process that would
provide a greater service in the area involved."1 9 3
Consequently, Senator Stevens successfully
pushed to table the Kerrey amendment.1 9 4 In
light of the above, it cannot be said that Congress
rejected metric measurements because it did not
want the Commission to have such power.
Second, even if Congress had let die a bill that
would have imposed such qualifying factors upon
Section 271 entry, such action does not preclude
the FCC from promulgating the same or similar
requirements provided that the regulation is in
the public interest and necessary to the effectuation of the Commission's functions pursuant to
Sections 4(i) and 303(r) of the Communications
Act of 1934.195 In National Broadcasting Company,1 96 for example, the Supreme Court upheld
the Commission's use of its public interest powers
to promulgate regulations (the "chain broadcasting regulations") significantly limiting network arrangements,197 despite the fact that, in 1934, Congress had vetoed proposed amendments to the

189 See Ameritech Illinois Legal Memorandum, supra note 9,
at 5, 29 (Congress rejected FCC's ability to impose "metric"
or other viable competition requirements including the requirement that competing providers serve a "substantial
number of business and residential customers.").
190 141 CONG. REc. H8425, H8454 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Bunn) (noting that amendment
was ruled out of order).
19,
141 CONG. REc. S8310, S8319 (daily ed. June 14,
1995) (introducing amendment number 1307).
192 Id. at S8320 (statement of Sen. Stevens) (expressing
repeatedly that Senator Kerrey's amendment would "preclude a small company" from entering the local exchange
market).
193
Id. at S8321 (Senator Kerrey's amendment "means
that [a] small carrier cannot enter [the local exchange market] until there is a larger carrier that would be able to handle the substantial test of the Senator's amendment.").
194
Id. at S8326 (amendment tabled by a vote of 79-21).
195 Section 4(i) of the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the Commission to "perform any and all acts, make
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications Act] as may be necessary
in the execution of its functions." Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152 4(I) (as amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996). That provision has been described as the
"necessary and proper clause" of the Communications Act.
See New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101,
1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and as permitting the Commission to
"stray a little way beyond the apparent boundaries of the Act
- to the extent necessary to regulate effectively those matters
already within [the Act's] boundaries." North American

Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir.
1985). Section 4(i), in conjunction with the Commission's
public interest powers, has been held to convey authority for
the agency to prescribe a rate of return for AT&T even
though the Act makes no mention of any authority to prescribe a rate of return. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 204 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (The Commission's action "was in the public interest [and] necessary for the Commission to carry out its functions.").
Pursuant to the public interest standard of the Act, the
Commission has also relied upon Section 303(r), which authorizes it to "[M]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act." Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (as
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996). Section
303(r) granted the Commission the power to promulgate
cross-ownership limitations, see FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793-801 (1978); institute
the fairness doctrine, see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 379-80 (1969); and to create EEO standards, see
Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
196
Nat'l. Broad. Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
197 Using the public interest standard, the Commission
forbid various network practices including exclusive contracts (which prevented an affiliate from broadcasting other
network's programs), long term contractual arrangements
(which tied a local station to a network for a term of years),
and rejection provisions (which restricted stations' ability to
refuse to air network programming). Id. at 190 (summarizing the Commission's public interest findings with respect to
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The Court's decision in National Broadcasting
Company was not unusual. It subsequently upheld
the Commission's regulation of cable television
despite the fact that the agency had earlier concluded that it lacked such authority and had been
turned down twice by Congress in efforts to obtain statutes expressly conveying such authority.199
Similarly, in North American Telecommunications Association, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Commission's order requiring the Bell Holding Companies, the BOCs' parents, to file capitalization
plans for subsidiaries selling phone equipment
even though the Communications Act did not expressly cover holding companies and the legislative history demonstrated that Congress had considered, but ultimately declined, to enact a
provision which would have granted the Commission full authority over holding companies. 200

The most recent and most analogous case is
that of Mobile Communications Corporation2 0 1 In
that case, the Commission relied upon its "statutory responsibilit[y] to grant a license only where
the grant would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity"20 2 in order to impose a thirty
million dollar payment 203 upon Mtel, the sole narrowband PCS pioneers preference holder. 204 The
D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's authority
to impose the payment 205 even though Congress
had: (1) let die a bill which would have expressly
granted such authority to the Commission; 206 (2)
integrated into the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act ("GATT") a provision granting authority to require payment from broadbandand all future pioneer preference holders;2 07 and (3) expressed
doubts about the Commission's authority, independent of the GATT provisions, to charge
Mtel and other pioneer preference holders for
their licenses. 20s
Of course, the Commission could not use Sec-

each now-precluded network practice).

oped a new service or technology. See PioneersPreferenceProce-

See William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC, 38 EMORY L.J. 715, 740 (Winter

dures Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 3488, 3492 (1991), recon. 7 FCC Rcd.
1808 (1992), further recon. 8 FCC Rcd. 1659 (1993). The preference entitled the applicant to bypass the Commission's
traditional licensing method (comparative hearings) and receive a license without having to pay. At the time of the Mo-

Communications Act aimed at granting regulatory authority over the networks to the Commission.

19 8

198

1989). Professor Mayton notes that the chain broadcasting
rules were predicated on the FCC's conclusion that "better
programming might be achieved by restricting network participation in local programming. But this same argument
had been made in Congress and had been rejected." Id. at
742 (discussing defeat of proposed amendment).
199 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 169-78 (1968).

See also New England Tel., 826 F.2d at

1107-09 (upholding FCC order requiring telephone companies to refund charges they had collected in excess of their
authorized rate of return because refunds were necessary to
remedy the violation of the Commission's order even though
the Act's only provision concerning refunds did "not apply to
the circumstances of this case.").
200
See North American Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 772
F.2d at 1291-93 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Lincoln Tel. And Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming Commission order requiring certain tariff filings by a
telephone company, assumed to be acting as a "connecting
carrier," even though the only provision in the Communications Act expressly requiring carriers to file tariffs, 47 U.S.C.
Section 203(a), specifically exempted "connecting carriers").
201
Supra note 118, at 1406.
202
See id. The Commission was "unable to determine
that a grant of a license to Mtel without payment would serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity as imposition
of the payment was "necessary" to fulfill the FCC's public interest mandate to promote fair competition in new services
such as narrowband PCS. See 9 FCC Rcd. at 3643, para. 33.
203
The Commission required Mtel to pay 90% of the
lowest winning bid in the narrowband PCS auction or $3 million dollars less than the lowest winning bid, whichever was
lower. Supra note 118, at 1403.
204
Under the Commission's rules, a "pioneers preference" was given to certain license applicants which had devel-

bile Communications Corporation decision, there were three

broadband PCS pioneers preference holders in additional to
Mtel, the sole narrowband PCS pioneer preference holder.
205 Although the court remanded the case to the Commission for consideration of whether Mtel's reliance interests
justified granting a license free of charge, the court affirmed
the fundamental premise that the "Commission .

.

. has the

statutory authority to require payment." Mobile Comm. Corp.,
supra note 120, at 1407.
206
Congressman Dingell, then-Chairman of the House
Commerce Committee, had sponsored H.R. 4700 which
would have required Mtel and all other pioneer preference
holders to pay 90% of the highest bid received for a comparable license at auction in order to receive their license. See
CCH Cong. Index 103d Cong. 28, 428-29 (1993-94). The
court was well aware of this fact. See Mobile Comm. Corp., supra

note 120, at 1412 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing
that legislation was "proposed" but "never enacted" which
would have imposed payment obligations upon pioneer's
preference holders.).
207
The GATT legislation, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)
(13), granted the FCC the authority to compel payment from
all the existing and future pioneer preference holders except
those whose applications "have been accepted for filing on or
before September 1, 1994." See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (13) (B),
(D) (iv). Mtel was the sole application meeting the above
criteria, i.e., it had been accepted for filing prior to September 1, 1994.
208
Congress admitted that it was expressly granting such
power to the Commission because "there may be some question about the authority of the Commission to require pioneer's preference holders to pay." See H.R. REP. No. 103-826,
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tion 4(i) in conjunction with Section
271(d) (3) (C) to impose a metric measurement
without demonstrating that the measurement was
"necessary in the execution of its functions"
under other provisions of the Act. 2 0 9 This demonstration would not seem too difficult in that entry
by a monopolist BOC (or a BOC obstructing entry
by local exchange competitors) would certainly
run afoul of Section 271 (d) (3) (C)'s mandate that
the Commission grant only those Section 271 applications consistent with the public interest. In
light of the interplay between the long-distance
and local exchange markets, the Commission
could conclude, much like its decision in Mobile
Communications, that long-distance entry by a monopolist and/or obstructionist BOC would advantage the BOC to the detriment of its competitors
and would distort the long-distance market. In
such circumstances, Section 4(i) is particularly
"appropriate." 210 Additionally, to the extent that
such distortion might ultimately reduce consumer
choices in either market, it would conflict with
Section 1 of 47 U.S.C. § 151's instruction for the
Commission to make communications services
available to all the people and thereby furtherjustify use of Section 4(i). Consequently, the mere
fact that Congress has declined to adopt a provision does not mean that the Commission is

barred from adopting the same or similar provision especially where, as would be the case here,
such action is pursuant to the Commission's statutory duties to grant licenses in the public interest.
Also, metric measurements would not conflict
with Section 271 (d) (4)'s admonishment not to
modify the checklist. Neither the checklist nor
Section 271 provide that the checklist is the exclusive statutory authority under which the Commission may examine BOC entry. 211 Indeed, Section
271 (d) (3) expressly requires something more
than the checklist, i.e. consistency with the public
interest. Thus, while the checklist may not dispense the authority to impose metric measurements, both sections 271 (d) (3) and 4(i) in fact do
just that.2 1 2 Accordingly, imposition of a metric
measurement - provided it is warranted by the
public interest and/or necessary to the execution
of the Commission's functions - does not constitute an unlawful modification of the checklist. 2 1 3

at 7 (1994), reprinted in 108 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4019. The
president's message likewise stated that the provision "eliminates the uncertainty arising from current legislation by mandating" payments for some licensees. See H.R. Dkt. No. 103316, at 1123 (1994).
209
47 U.S.C.A. § 154(i) (West Supp. 1996); North American Telecom Ass'n. v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir.
1985).
210
In upholding the Commission's actions under Section 4(i) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the D.C.
Circuit has held that it is appropriate to use Section 4(i) to

Commission can require a tariff to be filed. Thus, while
Section 203(a) did not grant the Commission the requisite authority [to require a tariff to be filed], Section
154(i) did.
Id. at 1108-09.
Similar reasoning was used in North American Telecomm.
Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the
court reasoned that Congress's denial of comprehensive authority over holding companies precluded the Commission
from adopting blanket rules concerning such companies.
However, it did not prevent the agency, pursuant to its Section 4(i) powers, from enacting regulations over holding
companies regarding the Commission's express authority relating to these holding companies' use of separate subsidiaries to provide certain services. Id. at 1292. Likewise, in Mobile
Communication Corporation,the court rejected arguments that
the Commission's statutory obligation to impose certain
small administrative licensing fees erased its ability to require
a $30 million dollar payment from Mtel. Supra note 120, at
1404-05.
213 See Mobile Comm. Corp., supra note 120, at 1406 (upholding payment condition on grounds that it was necessary
to execution of Commission's functions to "grant a license
only where the grant would serve the public interest, convenience and necessity."). See also North American, 772 F.2d at
1292 (To preclude absolutely the imposition of metric measures, the Act must say "hands off" metric measures as opposed to failing to grant the express authority to impose such
measures.).

regulate "bitter rivals" - such as IXCs and BOCs - when one

such rival has both the incentive and interest to limit the
competition posed by [competitors]" by "attempting to set
unreasonable terms and conditions" for interconnection and
other similar charges. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659
F.2d 1093, 1109.(D.C. Cir. 1981).
211
As noted, the Conference Report explains that the
checklist is merely the minimum access and interconnection
which must be offered by a BOC. See Conference Report, supra
note 2, at 144.
212 Analogous reasoning was used in Lincoln, 659 F.2d at
1092, wherein the court stated:
We can without deciding, assume that AT&T is a connecting carrier for purposes of Section 203(a), and is
therefore exempt from any tariff filing requirement that
the section might otherwise impose. Section 203(a)'s
terms do not, however, in any way suggest that the section provides the exclusive authority under which the

D.

Suggested Factors To Be Examined In
Analyzing The Long-distance Market

With respect to the examination of the BOC's
entry into long-distance, the Commission must
keep in mind that, contrary to the views of the
BOCs, the long-distance markets are relatively
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competitive. 214 This is evidenced by the fact that
AT&T has lost more than 40% of the market to
MCI and other competitors in the twelve years
since long-distance competition has heated up.215
Furthermore, AT&T's share is expected to drop to
45.8% in 1997 from 51.1% in 1995,216 and, as re-

cently reported, smaller long-distance companies
are continuing to steal market share from AT&T,
Sprint and MCI.2 1 7 Consequently, the incremental public interest benefits from BOC entry into
the already-competitive long-distance market
would be less than the benefits to the public from
finally having competitors enter the local exchange market. 218 This is especially true if the
Commission were to give BOCs a headstart over
new local exchange competitors with respect to
the ability to bundle both local and long-distance
services.
Research shows that most people would prefer
to obtain local and long-distance service from a
single provider. 219 For this reason, the Commission's Chief Economist has characterized as a
"quite weighty" argument the belief that premature long-distance entry by BOCs is especially dangerous since the BOCs will have the opportunity
to offer bundled local and long-distance services
throughout the State before any statewide local
entrant has similar ability. 22 0 In other words,
once a BOC receives Section 271 authority, it has
an immediate incentive to hinder or delay local
exchange entry by large IXCs (including AT&T,
MCI and Sprint) because such IXCs are likely the
most capable of competing in the local exchange
214 Professor Willig, for example, has observed that the
long-distance market is competitive and "has been for quite a
while." See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 144 (statement of Robert Farrell).
215
See Keller, supra note 135.
216
See Local Competition: Big Three Increasing Revenues But
Losing Shares to Smaller Competitors, EDGE, Nov. 4, 1996 (assessment of Atlantic-ACM, a strategy consulting firm).
217
See supra note 213.
218
See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 8 ("The benefits from adding another competitor to the long-distance
market are muted in comparison with adding a competitor to
[a] monopolized market" such as the local exchange market.). Id.
219
See Gautam Naik, Going Long: The Baby Bells All Have
Their Sights Set On the Long-distance Market, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 1996 (Telecommunications Supplement). Sprint pointed
out that there appears to be an "industry consensus" that
many customers will prefer to purchase their telecommunications services - local, long-distance, wireless, etc. - from a single company. See Shapiro Testimony, supra note 136, at 10.
The former head of the Commission's Office of Plans and
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market and, more importantly, the delay gives the
BOC a significant headstart over its IXC rivals in
the offering of bundled services.
The danger in granting a headstart to the BOCs
is amplified by the fact that nearly 40% of all revenue for long-distance companies comes from calls
that begin and end within a single Bell's territory
(for example a call from Boston to New York
would be made entirely within NYNEX's region).221 Thus, entry into the long-distance market alone provides BOCs with significant expansion opportunities. 222 For example, within five
months of entering the long-distance market,
GTE had signed up over 300,000 long-distance
customers,2 2 and continues to add approximately
6,000 new customers each day.2 2 4 SNET's longdistance subsidiary, Merrill Lynch, reportedly captured 30% of SNET's local customers within two
years of long-distance entry, an entry achieved
without regard to competition in the local market. Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that the
public interest weighs heavily against BOCs possessing a headstart over local exchange competitors in offering bundled services. Rather, the
BOCs should not be granted long-distance entry
until, among other things, local exchange competitors have the ability to bundle both local and
long-distance services to much the same customers as the BOC.
Finally, the Commission must satisfy itself that
the entering BOC lacks the ability to leverage unfairly its power in the local exchange market into
the long-distance market. 2 2 5 The Commission's
Policy has likewise noted that the central issue between the
BOCs and IXCs is which carrier will control the customer,
i.e., have the ability to sell the customer an entire package of
services. See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 110.
220 See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 15 (statement ofJoe Farrell) (Premature "long-distance entry may enable the BOC to sew up much of the one-stop shopping market, and that such a sewing up might somehow be hard to
challenge.").
221 See Naik, supra note 219.
222 Id. Analysts believe that the BOCs will seize from 1030% of the long-distance market within three years of entering. Id.
223

Id.

See Christina Lambert, Editorial,THE PANTAGRAPH OF
BLOOMINGTON, ILL., Nov. 10, 1996, at A15.
225 See 141 CONG. Rrc. S8464 (daily ed. June 15, 1995)
224

(statement of Senator Dorgan) ("The fact is that the longdistance market is a truly competitive market. We risk damaging that competitive market if the RBOCs are permitted to
enter the long-distance market prematurely.").
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Chief Economist, Joe Farrell, has explained the
importance of this point, observing that the there
are two primary problems for BOC entry into interLATA markets so long as the BOC has market
power in the local exchange:
First, if a [BOC] favors its long-distance affiliate by subtly withdrawing full cooperation from other long-distance companies, it can make excess profits in long-distance because it has hamstrung its long-distance rivals.
It may make less money in its bottleneck as a result, but
that may not deter it, and then "infectious monopoly"
results. Second, if a regulated monopolist .

.

. reports

as bottleneck costs what are really long-distance costs, it
may be able to defraud ratepayers who are committed
to covering the costs of the bottleneck.
These problems are hard to regulate away, because
the withdrawal of cooperation from rivals may be subtle, shifting, and temporary ... 226

In a subsequent statement, Chief FCC Economist
Farrell discussed the methodology for preventing
BOCs from discriminating or committing other
anticompetitive acts:
[T]he discrimination problem [s], as a matter of incentives, will vanish only when a BOC faces enough access
competition that it would expect to lose more in business and margins to other local and access providers
than it gains in long-distance, were it to withdraw the
fullest cooperation from the long-distance rivals. 2 27

Consequently, the public interest determination for BOC entry into long-distance hinges on
the BOC's power in the local exchange market. If
the BOC lacks power, its entry will benefit the
public interest; otherwise, BOC entry is simply the
beginning of the transformation of a competitive
long-distance market into a monopoly market
dominated by the BOC.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As shown, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
was designed to open telecommunications markets to competition. In promulgating this Act,
Congress specifically intended for competition to
take hold and flourish in the local exchange market which, until now, has been almost solely the
province of the monopoly BOCs. To that end,
Congress offered BOCs the reward of long-distance (interLATA) entry once their local exchange market was competitive. Competition in
the local exchange was a prerequisite to BOC inFarrell, supra note 133, at 207.
See FCC Economic Forum, supra note 132, at 14. See also
Farrell, supra note 133, at 208 (The "conditions laid down by
the Telecommunications Act [of 1996] mean that, when
BOC entry [into interLATA long-distance] is contemplated,
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terLATA entry because Congress realized that
such a requirement would prevent BOCs from using their local exchange power in anti-competitive
ways against interLATA rivals and that, without
the incentive of interLATA entry, BOCs would not
suffer local exchange competitors.
To assist the Federal Communications Commission in assessing when competition was sufficient
to temper a BOC's local exchange power, Congress promulgated the checklist, required the
presence of facilities-based competitors, and imposed separate affiliation requirements. However, as it often does, Congress left the final determination to the expert agency, the FCC, by
mandating that all Section 271 applications must
be consistent with the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." In so doing, Congress specifically intended for the agency to have the authority to fully review all aspects of Section 271
applications.
The BOCs' misunderstanding of the public interest is exhibited in their contention that the bar
on altering the checklist limits the Commission's
public interest powers to review of the express requirements of Section 271. That view would remove the fluidity of the public interest, rendering
it static and unchanging. However, the BOCs'
reading (or misreading) of the public interest is
unsupported by Section 271's plain language and
legislative history. Indeed, more than twenty
years ago, the Ninth Circuit explained why grant
of "public interest" authority conferred dynamic
and fluid powers:
The Commission's authority is stated broadly to avoid
the need for repeated congressional review and revision of the Commission's authority to meet the needs
of a dynamic rapidly changing industry. Regulatory
practice and policies that will serve the 'public interest'
today may be quite different from those that were adequate to that purpose in [the past] or that may further
2 28
the public interest in the future.

Section 271 plainly obligates the Commission to
scrutinize all BOC interLATA applications to ensure that the grant of such applications is consistent with the public interest. The heart of public
interest is fair and workable competition. Thus,
the public interest counsels that the grant of Sec-

226

it supposedly won't be a pure bottleneck monopoly. .

227

the local exchange market.).
228
See Wash. Util. and Transp. Comm'n. v. FCC, 513
F.2d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir 1974).
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tion 271 applications should occur only when a
BOC would be unable to use its local exchange
power to unfairly disadvantage its rivals. Otherwise, BOC interLATA entry will not herald the advent of local exchange competition, but instead
the end of competition in the long-distance markets. Such an undesirable result would be consistent, not with the public interest, but with the interest of the BOCs. In sum, Section 271's public
interest mandate obligates the Commission to en-

229

sure that BOCs receiving interLATA authority
lack the ability to compete unfairly against their
rivals. Pursuant to its statutory obligations, the
Commission may - in the context of a given BOC
application - scrutinize areas or impose conditions outside of those contained in the checklist
in order to be certain that grant of interLATA authority will result in more, rather than less, interLATA and intraLATA competition. That is the
essence of the public interest under Section 271.

